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# West Europe Report

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## FIVE INSTITUTES ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE, SECURITY

Frankfurt/ Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Apr 83 p 10

[Article: "Recommendations for a Joint European Security Policy"]

[Text] The introduction to the text which is excerpted below states that "profound apprehension and a sense of urgency have been the motive for this report." The report in question is a study on the crisis within EC prepared by the foreign policy institutes of five European countries and entitled "The EC Faces a Decision—Progress or Dis-integration." It was prepared with the help of a group of experts. The authors are Karl Kaiser of the German Society for Foreign Policy; Thierry de Montbrial of the French Institute of International Relations in Paris; William Wallace of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London; Cesare Merlini of the International Affairs Institute in Rome and Edmund Wellenstein of the Dutch "Clingendael" Institute for International Affairs in The Hague. This is the first joint European study of its kind prepared with the help of grants from the European Cultural Foundation and the European Commission. The study will appear as a 100-page book, published in German by Europa Union Verlag. From this book we have taken the following excerpts dealing with the defense of Europe and the possibilities and limitations of a joint EC security policy as an informal aspect of European political cooperation.

Neither the establishment, nor the subsequent development of the community can be viewed separately from major considerations of peace and security policy.

In view of the fact that security issues have always been among the most sensitive with regard to national policy, national sovereignty and independence and have always been most jealously guarded, we know that the different positions and policies favored by the various members of the community are very likely to make every effort to solve this problem extremely difficult. Two of the EC members are nuclear powers as well as permanent members of the UN Security Council. In addition, they bear a responsibility for several areas outside Europe. These characteristics are not shared by any

of the other members. Nine of the member nations also hold membership in NATO—with France and Greece not being part of the integrated command structure. Ireland is pursuing a special kind of neutrality. Both the views of the individual member nations and their priorities tend to differ greatly. But we still believe that the present world situation makes it necessary to adopt a step-by-step approach to dealing with security policy issues within the community.

We also believe that the time is ripe for the EC to examine the problems of peace and security; to obtain clarity on the issues being contested and to develop and assign new responsibilities with a view to European cooperative endeavors and communities within a framework of joint Western efforts.

A new situation is about to develop as the EC expands to 10 members and as Portugal and Spain prepare to enter the community. For the first time in the postwar era—leaving the special case of Ireland aside—the EC will have the same membership as NATO (with the exception of Norway and Turkey). This raises the possibility of a more balanced alliance as between North America and Western Europe in which the EC might become the basis of the European NATO pillar.

Ever since 1970, the EC member nations have been working together in a variety of ways in the field of foreign and security policy—particularly within the informal framework of European Political Cooperation—which in fact has been providing the structural basis for foreign policy cooperation. This loose series of meetings of foreign ministers and high-ranking government officials first gave proof of its importance on the occasion of CSCE between 1973 and 1975.

We take note of the useful, although limited, contributions made by European Political Cooperation in the field of coordinating national reactions to international developments. We also welcome its closer ties to the original community by having the European Commission take part in its working groups and by putting an end to the strict distinction between meetings of the ministerial council and those of the foreign ministers. In the final analysis, European Political Cooperation figures as an extension of the EC structure whose effectiveness depends on the strength and future development of the community and its policies. For this reason, it can only be open to full members of the community.

The Genscher Colombo Plan, based on the 1981 London report, contains a minimum of desirable improvements—particularly with regard to the inclusion of security issues in European Political Cooperation—and must therefore be supported.

#### Europe as a Guarantor of Peace

Many people have forgotten that it was the desire for lasting peace in Western Europe which gave the greatest impetus to the establishment of EEC.

Only very few members of the younger generation, who have made peace their main concern and know about the beginnings of the community only from their history books, are aware of the fact that the EC represents the biggest victory of the first peace movement in Europe after the war--and that it was born out of the bitter experience of occupation, fratricidal conflict and the annihilation programs of the Second World War. The children of the very same Europeans who answered the call to kill each other now look upon peace in Western Europe as a matter of course and not too many of them are aware of the fact that the EC represents the end result of many years of hard work devoted to transforming this Western part of Europe into a zone of peace.

During the course of CSCE, the European Community acted as a group for the first time at a major East-West conference and carried out a joint security policy. Of course, all the individual steps were closely coordinated among the Western partners and particularly with the United States. Nonetheless, the community did develop a will and a position of its own in this field for the first time. Up to then, arms control--with the exception of the confidence-building aspects of CSCE--had exclusively been approached by the EC members on their own or as members of other groupings, such as for example at the MBFR negotiations. Other aspects of East-West relations have since become a concern of European Political Cooperation--particularly at the CSCE followup conferences in Belgrade and Madrid. This is a reflection of a new definition of the community's role in a crucial area of security policy.

For about three decades, Europe was the focal point of the East-West conflict. Possible incidents in Europe--above all a possible attack by the Warsaw Pact against the FRG--were the main concern of the West which found expression in the establishment of institutions, military structures and customary cooperative ventures. In the seventies, the outlook underwent a dramatic change. Measured against the probability of conflict, the biggest threat to stability no longer resides in Central Europe for the protection of which NATO was originally created but in a region removed from this periphery--the Near and Middle East. It reminds one of the situation in the Balkans in the early 20th century and its relevance to the outbreak of World War I.

The threat is dual in nature. On the one hand, every conflict in the Near or Middle East which involves the Soviet Union may escalate and spread to Europe. On the other hand, Europe's dependence on Mideast oil is so great that an interruption of the flow of oil would soon paralyze the European (as well as the Japanese) economy. Due to lesser dependence on oil from the Near and Middle East, the United States would be in a better position to survive. That does not mean of course that it would only be a matter of concern for the Europeans and the Japanese to protect oil supplies from this region because a collapse of the economies of Europe and Japan--which are two of the most important allies of the United States--would also affect the U.S. in a most serious way. Thus, it is not only "European oil" that America is called upon to protect.

Relative stability between East and West in Europe is provided for through a well-functioning system of deterrence based on nuclear and conventional defense, on distinct lines of demarcation and on uncontested political authority based in its turn on relatively rational conduct of political leaders and bureaucracies. All these factors scarcely apply in the Near and Middle East. The combined and cumulative effect of four sources of conflict turn this area into a prime instability factor.

#### Mideast and Near East Crises

There is the possibility of an East-West confrontation in the Near and Middle East.

There are national, religious and ethnic rivalries.

There is the possibility of revolutions and internal uprisings.

There may be war between Israel and the Arabs.

These threats cannot be met by extending NATO's jurisdiction geographically to include the Near and Middle East.

But the members of the EC can no longer afford to neglect an issue which has become as much of a threat to their security as the military challenge faced in Central Europe. There are some elements of concerted action already in effect; but in general terms, there still is a tendency in Europe to close one's eyes to these crises or to harbor the hope that the United States will somehow manage to cope with them, leaving the Europeans to enjoy the benefits of such a policy while not calling on them to make any contribution of their own.

The number and intensity of the differences of opinion on security policy between Europe and America have both been on the rise.

The detente policies of the seventies are not being viewed in quite the same way on the two sides of the Atlantic. While in the United States the opinion generally prevails that detente was a failure, the majority of the Europeans, for its part, feels that it did produce some limited but noteworthy gains in a number of areas. There are many Europeans who even feel that detente benefitted the United States too—as for example in connection with the stabilizing effect which the Four-Power agreement on Berlin had.

There are similar sharp differences of opinion between the United States and its European allies regarding trade with the Soviet Union which are also felt as a strain.

As a consequence of these fundamental disagreements and operational differences of opinion on policy toward Poland, U.S. dissatisfaction with its European allies reached hitherto unprecedented levels. Even conservative editorial writers and political figures began to express public doubt in the value of NATO for the first time—a question that had never been raised by correspond-

ing circles in Europe up to then. This growing impatience coupled with less of a readiness to accept differences of opinion with the Europeans probably is an expression of a longer-term trend which also has something to do with the transfer of political decision-making to the West and South of the United States.

In Western Europe, a corresponding dissatisfaction with the most recent developments in the United States may be noted. American skepticism with regard to detente, arms control, and continued trade relations with the Soviet Union combined with a rigorous arms buildup, a certain semantic carelessness with regard to the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe and American government policy toward the Third World has confirmed those in their views--not only within the peace movement--who are taking very critical exception with the prevailing ideological cast of U.S. policies.

Even though the future development of these shifts in perception may be difficult to predict, it is likely to result in a differentiation between the United States and Europe--a certain decline in the importance of Europe in the eyes of American security policy coupled with a strengthening of a European position in certain areas of security policy.

Any consideration of a European defense strategy must start out from the continuing significance of the East-West struggle in Europe. Contrary to many expectations in the seventies, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West will continue--both with respect to the power struggle between the two superpowers on European soil as well as with respect to the two irreconcilable ideologies of totalitarian rule and Western democracy.

At no time did a powerful movement in support of an independent, European defense strategy exist--independent and separate from the Atlantic security structure including the United States and Canada. Even EDC, which was in fact supported by the United States, was part of an Atlantic strategy.

Today, voices are being heard once again which call for a European defense establishment as re-insurance against a withdrawal of the United States from existing obligations.

If, for the sake of argument, one accepts such a pessimistic premise, what could such an entirely independent European defense structure look like? A European defense establishment could not offset the absence of American troops, if it took over existing NATO regulations on the relations between sovereign nations which retain the right to make their own decisions in case of attack--even though this right is circumscribed in substance due to the presence of troops as well as integrated military command structures. It would take a unified system based on a common will--which is to say a genuine federation including a European government, a European defense ministry and a European supreme commander at the head of a European defense force. It would take, in addition, a European nuclear force capable of posing minimum deterrence and of delivering a strategic second strike of sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy. It would also take tactical short and medium-range nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe.

## An Independent European Defense Establishment

Any plan for an independent European defense establishment capable of coping with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would thus presuppose the existence of a United States of Europe—which is to say full political union. This cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future.

Historical evidence rebuts any withdrawal or reduction of Soviet armed forces. A precondition for any European option would therefore have to be a European nuclear capability which could act independently on the basis of its own strategic and tactical weapons systems. If one starts out with the assumption that France and Great Britain were in a position to contribute their nuclear weapons to a multinational nuclear force (they do not seem to be prepared to do so at this stage) and that the United States, for its part, would add its technological support, the buildup of such a nuclear force would still take at least 10 years and would meet with vehement resistance on the part of the Soviet Union—which would probably be an even more decisive factor.

The dual task of setting up a European nuclear force and of substantially increasing the size of conventional forces could only be accomplished through a steep rise in defense expenditures which would call for sums far greater than those spent over the past decades and would double the defense budgets in the next few years bringing them up to the levels customarily set aside in American budgets.

Such ideas—which, for that matter, do not take security problems outside Europe into consideration—are indicative of the fact that any independent European defense posture without the United States not only is unrealistic but would also greatly endanger European security.

Nonetheless, there is a growing need for a European security policy. The view that Europe might by dint of further progress along the road toward unity become a "civilian power" has been overtaken by events. This view, which did play a certain role in international discussions in the late sixties and early seventies held, that Europe would by pooling its resources and making headway toward unity perform a special mission distinct and separate from the superpowers. The idea was that Europe would exert an influence not on the strength of traditional power politics or military strength—as the two superpowers are doing—but by consciously injecting itself into the expanding network of relationships—particularly with the Third World. In this endeavor, priority would be given to non-military and democratic values on which European culture and history are founded.

Anyone calling for equal distance between Europe and the superpowers to be maintained today or for withdrawing from the East-West confrontation has lost all touch with reality. The old antagonism between repressive systems which show no respect for personal liberties and the Western democracies is as sharply delineated as ever. Events in Poland and the sharply repressive nature of various East European regimes offer proof of this every day. Whatever Europeans do not like about American domestic policies and specific foreign

policy actions—such as in support of right-wing regimes—that does not alter the fact that the American superpower is a democracy while the Soviet Union is not. There can be no equal distance between Europe and the two superpowers. Europe's place is in the democratic camp—even if it does differ with the United States on policy, on goals and in terms of power.

If Europe cannot evade the power politics of today's world—why and to what extent must it then conduct a security policy of its own in the name of European identity? There are two good reasons for it.

First, there is a demand for a European contribution to the stabilization of crisis areas. This applies in particular to the Near and Middle East. If the nations of the Third World look for an alternative to the oppressive presence of one superpower or the other, then it is in many instances Western Europe, acting as a group, which they can properly turn to.

Secondly, Europe and the United States do have a number of common, vital interests but there are some areas in which they also have different priorities and interests. This applies, for example, to the Near and Middle East where Europe appears to place a greater emphasis on non-military options such as diplomatic overtures and economic aid. Where concrete problems are concerned such as ways of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict—Europe as a rule agrees with the United States on goals but differs on the choice of the means to achieve them.

#### A Clearer European Security Posture

At a time when segments of our society are increasingly questioning the consensus on peace and security policy, Europe should attempt to become a forum for the reestablishment of the consensus on peace and security and, within a European framework, to mobilize the responsibilities and resources which are required to preserve lasting peace. Above all, a more distinct European security policy is needed in order to give proof to the smaller nations that their cooperation is valued and considered important. And vis-a-vis the United States, a clearer European security posture would help correct the distorted perceptions of some Americans with regard to European defense efforts.

In times of continuing recession and extraordinary budget problems coupled with exploding costs of modern conventional weapons, it is highly uncertain whether existing conventional forces can be maintained at present levels both in terms of structure and strength. Unless new ways of drastically cutting costs can be found or successful East-West negotiations actually lead to a reduction of forces, the conventional posture of Western Europe might be seriously impaired. The argument that this problem could be resolved through substantial increases of military budgets in real terms seems rather theoretical. Most European governments are barely capable of holding present levels of (real) defense expenditures. They are under constant pressure to cut defense spending. The only possible way of cutting

costs substantially would seem to be in the area of large-scale standardization and a division of labor among the NATO member countries. As long as we do not have just one tank, one aircraft, one howitzer, we are likely to be overrun by exploding costs.

Within NATO, European security identity should be strengthened on the political level on the basis of the 1981 London agreement concerning the discussion of the political aspects of security policy in the European Political Cooperation framework. This should apply to all substantive political issues—not including operational military matters—in the discussions taking place at meetings of the ministerial council.

It appears desirable to effect a rationalization of European institutions in the interests of greater security policy effectiveness. The West European Union should be strengthened as an instrument of European policy based on its strong obligation to provide assistance under the existing treaty. This should be done by extending membership to all EC members who are prepared to shoulder such additional responsibilities in European defense and political coordination. At the same time, the functions of the WEU assembly should be reviewed with an eye to the mission of the European Parliament which has already taken the initiative in dealing with security issues. As far as the European Parliament is concerned, the council members who have for some time been discussing security issues within the European Political Cooperation should begin to change places regularly with the Parliament so that it can debate and vote on such issues and thereby offer guidance to the European Political Cooperation.

Cooperation on security issues should develop organically on the basis of the strengthening of the existing system of European Political Cooperation which is to become the central instrumentality to coordinate and define the policies and views of the EC in the area of peace policy and security policy.

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TERRORISM

SPAIN

INTERIOR, BASQUE OFFICIALS ACT ON GUIBERT KIDNAPPING

Interior Ministry Offers Reward

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 23 Mar 83 p 20

[Article by Patxo Unzueta]

[Text] Bilbao--Yesterday, the Interior Ministry offered a reward of 20 million pesetas to whomever provides information or evidence that may lead to locating Guipuzcoa industrialist Jesus Guibert, manager of the enterprise Marcial Ucin, S.A., kidnapped Monday in Azpeitia in an act of terrorism. Yesterday, by means of a call to the newspaper EGIN, the Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos, a group formed 6 years ago by collectives that had previously split away from the ETA, claimed responsibility for the act. Also, the spokesman for the Guibert family confirmed yesterday that 3 years ago the kidnapping victim had received letters from the ETA demanding the payment of the revolutionary tax.

The anonymous caller, in claiming to EGIN responsibility for the action, presented, as proof of the veracity of his words, information on the exact location of the automobile, property of Guibert's enterprise, which was used in the kidnapping. The car was found at the indicated place next to a block of housing near the Anoeta parking area.

In a press conference held in a San Sebastian hotel, Javier Guibert, younger brother of the kidnapping victim and family spokesman, indicated that the kidnapping victim led a very regular life. On Monday, he called the factory before leaving home for Azpeitia to see if there was something that he needed to do first in San Sebastian.

A Marcial Ucin employee met him going the other way at the highway exit near Arrona. In Guibert's office, not much importance was given to his apparent lateness until 10:30 am. It was then that someone called the industrialist San Sebastian home, where they confirmed that he had left home at the usual time.

At 11 am, in view of the fact that the garage door was found uncustomarily open, the uneasiness turned into alarm and the municipal government, the

Civil Government of Guipuzcoa and the Basque government were alerted. The brother of the kidnapping victim, an economist and he, too, a manager of an enterprise--"Accesorios de Tuberia, S.A." of Salvatierra (Alava)--confirmed having heard his brother say several years ago that they had demanded that he pay the revolutionary tax, but he said that he did not know which branch of the ETA was involved in the extortion or whether or not his brother had paid it.

Ramon Jauregui, the government delegate in the autonomous community, and Julen Elgorriaga, governor of Guipuzcoa, were the first public personalities to come to the family home on Zubieta Street, house number 22, hardly 50 meters from the house of Miguel Echeverria, the youth who was kidnapped last January.

Immediately after yesterday's press conference, several reporters encountered the youth Echeverria in the street in front of the Londres Hotel. Miguel Echeverria confirmed that a brother of his is engaged to one of Guibert's daughters and he said that he was thinking about stopping by the latter's home later to express his support.

The lendakari Garaikoetxea and Eli Galdos, Basque vice councillor for the interior, also expressed interest over the telephone in the details of the kidnapping and stayed in touch with the family throughout Monday evening.

In addition to the communiques condemning the act--from the Azpeitia Municipal Government, employers, union headquarters and the principal political forces --that had been registered by late Monday, yesterday there was a call for a public demonstration signed by the parties PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party], Euskadiko Ezkerra [Basque Left], PCE [Communist Party of Spain] and the Carlist Party of the said locality in Guipuzcoa. Also coming to the meeting, which had been called the day before by the extraordinary plenum of the municipal government, were representatives of the Marcial Ucin works committee, of the union offices operating in the zone and of various cultural organizations there.

All of those present signed the petition for a silent demonstration to take place today at 8 pm in Azpeitia. It will leave from the people's square and, after traversing the principal streets of the place, it will end up in front of the Ucin house on the Paseo de los Fueros.

#### Basque Government To Act

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 23 Mar 83 p 20

[Article by Tonia Etxarri]

[Text] Vitoria--In a press conference held yesterday, Ramon Labayen, spokesman for the Basque Government, affirmed that the executive branch of the Basque Country "will deploy all means" against the kidnappers of industrialist Jesus Guibert to locate him.

A few hours before the Interior Ministry offered a reward of 20 million pesetas to anyone providing information that may contribute to locating the presumed kidnappers of the industrialist from Guipuzcoa, the Basque government announced its willingness to "cooperate with any request." After indicating that acts similar to the kidnapping of Jesus Guibert or the explosion that occurred yesterday in an office of the Bank of Bilbao indicate "total contempt for human rights and freedom," Ramon Labayen announced the "deployment of all the means" of the Basque government in these cases.

"The Basque government, in speaking of promoting the deployment of all means, is referring to their more technical aspects, that is, to cooperating with any organization able to bring about the capture of those responsible. Such repeated acts in this country cause serious harm to the Basque population."

In regard to the central administration's opposition to seven articles of the law standardizing the Basque language, the Basque government recognizes that there is a certain vagueness as to its scope because the appeal has still not been taken up by the Constitutional Court.

The first institutional measures protesting the appeal presented by the central government regarding the mentioned law will be made known in the course of the plenary session of the Basque Parliament that begins today in Vitoria.

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CSO: 3548/296

## 'REFORMED' TERRORIST ON SPANISH LIBERATION ARMY

Madrid YA in Spanish 15 Mar 83 p 13

[Text] Two former civil guards have been arrested as a result of the statements by Manuel Reinero Banda, a member of the ultra-right organization Spanish Liberation Army. In his statements, he tells all about the framework of the organization, making possible his inclusion in the sphere of what in the future will be the law of the repentant terrorist.

These two former civil guards are Francisco Reina Leonar and Daniel Lopez, previously sergeant and corporal, respectively, and now municipal policemen in Ripollet.

The spokesman for the Interior Ministry indicated that the minister has the political will to get to the bottom of the investigations and to clarify the appropriate responsibilities.

The statements by Manuel Reinero refer to the activities of the self-named Spanish Liberation Army. In those statements, he claims that he received orders from the named municipal policemen, that, among other actions, he was ordered to make an attempt on the lives of the mayor and assistant mayor, to set fire to the town hall and to assassinate a municipal policeman. He adds that gifts were made to the organization Fuerza Nueva de Sabadell y Mostoles and that 950,000 pesetas were designated for the purchase of 10 machineguns, which were to be acquired in Belgium.

Although the Interior Ministry has said nothing in the matter, Manuel Reinero accuses a Civil Guard lieutenant, now stationed in Madrid and having the rank of captain, of being another of the persons from whom he received orders.

He also accuses members of the Civil Guard of attacking the residence of a presumed robber of one of the residences of the named organization, as well as of attacking the town hall of Palau de Plegamans in Barcelona.

Based on these statements, the trial was postponed pending the results of the new investigations.

Manuel Reinero states that the confiscated weapons and ammunition were provided to him by the cited Civil Guard lieutenant. One of the pistols, he

adds in his statement, was delivered to him in the branches of the Civil Guard headquarters, in the presence of another civil guard, when the weapon was confiscated.

To justify this statement, the official of the Spanish Liberation Army cited a letter that he sent to the Civil Guard lieutenant asking him to come and see him, as he felt abandoned and deceived, at the same time threatening to tell everything. In answer, he received a letter from an attorney in Sabadell saying that the lieutenant could not come to see him but that he should not worry because everything was going well and he should wait before making any decision to act. Help did not arrive and the terrorist made the declaration that has created such a stir.

9746

CSO: 3548/296

## FIRST LARGE STRIP-MINING PROJECT AT CARMAUX

Paris LE MONDE DIMANCHE in French 20 Feb 83 p V

[Article by Michel Abadie: "The Large-Scale Work at Carmaux"]

[Text] Aquitaine Coal Mines wants to open the first large French strip mining development. Enormous digging operations which everyone, or almost everyone, accepts in the name of the preservation of employment. But the bet has not yet been won....

Aquitaine Coal Mines, which is developing the Carmaux and Decazeville coal basin, is getting ready to start an enormous work site which will exceed the digging works of the Aswan Dam. In 30 years, a mountain of 300 million cubic meters of earth will be moved in order to give birth to a mouse of 15 million tons of coal, i.e., less than 3.7 percent of the national production each year.

This will be the first strip mining operation of some significance in France; this method is very widespread across the Atlantic. This imposing project will require an investment of around one billion francs. The principle of the operation has just been approved in the midst of an almost total silence following two (discrete) successive inquiries designed to determine whether it is in the public interest. If the Economic and Social Development Fund (F.D.E.S.), which is presently examining the documents with a view towards preparing the Ninth Plan, agrees to finance the coal mines of France, which is already greatly in debt,<sup>(1)</sup> first operations will begin during 1983, thereby opening a 3 by 10 kilometer sore south of Carmaux (Tarn).

The "stots" operation<sup>(2)</sup> of Sainte-Marie and of Tronquie-Lavoir will take place over a mining concession extending from the outskirts of the town where coal has been extracted since the 18th century, to the Lintin plateau, where several farmers are making an effort to work a pebbly earth situated among small scraggy oaks.

For the past 2 years, three gigantic wheel-shovels from Germany will each put out, night and day, 1,300 cubic meters of earth per hour, resting only over the weekend for maintenance purposes and in order to grant the neighbors their evening rest. Sixty million cubic meters of "sterile" earth will be moved by conveyor belt to two huge waste dumps on either side of the village of

Cagnac-les-Mines, which today lies on a spur and tomorrow will be in the middle of an artificial plain of over 300 hectares (740 acres). These voracious machines are to cease working at the end of 1985, after having dug a circular hole with a diameter of one kilometer and a depth of 110 meters.

Then the operation itself, will begin involving 5 million tons of coal that have been lying dormant since the 1973 shutdown of the Sainte-Marie pit, 4 kilometers from Carmaux. Numerous mine blasts will reduce the 50 million cubic meters of coal terrain into coarse blocks to be picked up by a "conveyor set-up" of approximately ten "dumpers", which are American or Japanese gigantic trucks designed to remove approximately one hundred tons per load and bring them to two crushers. From there, the fragments will be brought to the "cleaning station" to separate the good coal from the rocky impure material.

In 1993, with the bottom of the hole scraped to within less than 280 meters, the first strike will be exhausted. But in the meantime, in 1991, or thereabouts, the same work will be started on the outskirts of the town of Carmaux, at Tronquie--the last hole of the basin presently in service--and at the Lavoir. On that site, it is expected that 10 million tons of coal will be extracted by moving 180 million cubic meters of terrain. "Sterile earth" and waste materials will be used to fill the hole at Sainte-Marie by forming a waste dump of 220 hectares (540 acres).

#### Ten Times Larger Than At Paluel

This excavation holocaust, which will leave its indelible mark on somewhat less than 2,500 acres, will end the long and painful mining agony of the Carmausin. Then, this region, finally liberated from the mine--a life-giving and voracious mother--will get its chance to leave its mono-production.

Today, the management of the Aquitaine Coal Mines, while minimizing the size of the project by comparing it with the Rhineland lignite mines, is somewhat proud of this "strike", which involves digging operations which are ten times larger than those of a nuclear reactor like Paluel."

In this region, sharply striken by the crisis,<sup>(3)</sup> employment is the main question on everybody's mind. From the miners' quarters to the steps of the town halls affected by the project, it's the same story: "It doesn't matter what the damage is as long as there are jobs." At Carmaux, in 1962, the mine was employing 5,586 people: today, there are only 2,388. If nothing is done, the mine will close its doors in 1992 by placing the last miners recruited to other basins. The management of the mine, which is conscious of its responsibility as the main employer, has indeed understood that this problem had to be solved differently. Since 1973, it has created, with the cooperation of the services of the prefecture, the Chamber of Commerce and DATAR, an association for the industrial development of the Albi-Carmaux region (ADIRAC), whose task it is to encourage industrialists to set up their activities in the region and set aside jobs for the miners. An engineer has been made available with this single objective in mind. Today, approximately 300 jobs have been created in a rather unfavorable period.

The project, in fact, will provide only several years of additional breathing time, since it only requires 600 people for completion. Does this justify such investments (935 million francs)? "The project is profitable in and of itself, declares Claude Badey, director of the Aquitaine Coal Mines. We are here to produce coal at a competitive price on the international market. If the dollar is worth 7 francs, the strikes alone provide a profit of 7 to 21 francs per hilotherm produced without any government aid.<sup>(4)</sup> By maintaining the operation at the bottom, the equilibrium is tangent." Indeed, the miners at the bottom produce, in Aquitaine, only 3 tons a day per work station whereas in the "strike" 9.5 tons are reached. Consequently, labor at the bottom, accounts for 60 percent of the cost as opposed to 25 percent on the surface.

The unions themselves are unanimous in calling for an upswing in coal mining and immediate hiring. The government, after vague promises with regard to production, seems to have committed itself to a more realistic direction.

This is the last hope of several unusual opponents "strikes" particularly the Association for the respect of everyone's interests and of the environment, which encompasses 170 persons in the commune of Garric, which will receive the largest heap.

"For the past 20 years, they have been telling us that the mine will close down in 1985," says Mr. Treilhou, the president of the Association, a farmer who farms 55 hectares (135 acres). "In all that time, no effort to foresee the conversion was made. Construction was allowed to take place, land was sold and today, the coal mines want to take back the 22 hectares (54 acres) that they sold to us in 1974. They promise us a paradise in 25 years but in the meantime, it will be hell. There is talk of preserving jobs; but in eliminating 550 hectares (1,235 acres) of arable land or pastures, 10 farms will die, thus affecting 250 jobs upstream or downstream."

#### Aside From Grass, Nothing Will Grow

At the base of the plateau in the small valley of Lascombe, which is to be partially obliterated beneath the "sterile earth", Jean Rives, who farms 60 hectares (150 acres), explains with fatalistic overtones: "We are a minority of farmers in the midst of laborers and often they are the customers who come to look for fresh products at the farm. We understand their employment problems, but to smother us in waste dumps! The strikes will not endure like a dam. In 30 years it will be finished. They are promising to make the land arable, but by that time we will be under ground. We will no longer be interested."

Indeed, the Coal Mines (of Aquitaine) have committed themselves to restoring the site by improving the borders of the waste dumps by planting trees and by covering the "sterile earth" with 2 meters of arable land. "They do not doubt anything," notes Maurice Clemente, a former petroleum engineer who has taken up residence on the edge of the Sainte-Marie "stot." "The physical and chemical composition of the soil will be upset. As far as the hydraulic system is concerned, it is better not to talk about it. Aside from the grass, nothing will grow."

In the middle of his 15 hectare (37 acre) estate on which 5,000 oaks are planted, Mr. Clemente has created a natural reserve around a lake where 40 species of birds dwell. "The Sainte-Marie stot is what will cause the most damage," he explains. "In order to extract 5 million tons of coal, they are going to remove 110 million cubic meters of "sterile earth" and devastate 200 hectares (500 acres). While it is possible to extract another 1 1/2 million tons of coal through the bottom without any damage and colossal investment. And as for employment, this would end up unchanged, considering the difference in production between the bottom and the surface."

These arguments have been recognized by the committee of inquiry on usefulness to the public. While giving a favorable opinion to the project, it has voiced the hope that the Sainte-Marie "stot" be abandoned. The Coal Mines management does not want to hear about it. "To extract from the bottom would be to divide the reserves by three and double the costs," affirms Claude Badey." This would make the project worthless." For the people affected directly, the verdict seems to be without appeal.

The local elected officials, sensitized by the Saut-du-Tarn affair,<sup>(5)</sup> are in favor of the project in the name of saving jobs. At Carmaux, maintaining coal is an electoral factor: the mining profession, no matter how difficult it may be, remains a privilege because of its side advantages.

On the whole, the only protests are requests for guarantees against nuisances--noises, dusts, diversions of springs, pollution of phreatic layers--inherent in this type of operation. As Andre Raust, the (socialist) mayor of Cagnac-les-Mines summarized so well: "Constraints are accepted when there is a crisis." At Blaye-les-Mines, a village built on a coal hill, the (communist) mayor, Jean Coutouly, while admitting that "the maximum must be extracted through the bottom," declares "that no strikes should be made unless all of them are made." In the old village, which has a tendency to vote Right, there are murmurs that for the sake of jobs the hamlet will finally be levelled in order to extract the 10 tons of coal. At Garric, the mayor, Mr. Savy, realizes objectively: "I wanted to form a very agreeable commune and they are going to turn it into an ash heap. I will acquiesce because, today, for an elected official, jobs are the main concern."

MICHEL ABADIE

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#### FOOTNOTES

1. Bruno Dethomas: "The deficit of the Charbonnages de France will increase considerably in 1982" LE MONDE of May 8, 1982 and "The Coal Policy of France" LE MONDE of October 16, 1982.
2. Technical term designating an unworked land area designed to protect a surface installation.
3. Danielle Rouard: "The French in a Period of Crisis. Albi-Carmaux, the Retired Make the Law" LE MONDE of October 21, 1979.

4. The subsidy to national coal amounted to 2.5 centimes per therm in 1982. It should be reactualized in 1983 to reach 3.8 centimes.
5. The Saut-du-Tarn, a tool manufacturing firm which employs 1,100 people faces financial difficulties. Local organizations have agreed to participate in the capital in order to avoid layoffs which would be disastrous for the region.

9286

CSO: 3519/340

ECONOMIC.

DENMARK

FINANCE MINISTER VIEWS IMPACT OF BRUSSELS CURRENCY CHANGES

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22 Mar 83 p 1

[Text] Impact of currency changes on Danish krone "approximately zero," says government.

The agreement on currency changes in Brussels has improved the Danish competitiveness "slightly," and if the EC countries refrain from granting one another equalization amounts in relation to the British pound sterling, the disadvantages to Danish agriculture should be greatly limited, Minister of Finance Henning Christophersen stated at a press conference in the Prime Minister's office last Monday night.

"The impact on the Danish krone is approximately zero," Henning Christophersen said.

He pointed out that the krone has been adjusted downward in relation to the countries which have the greatest prospects of an economic upswing. The other countries, for their part, have a special need for economic tightening. Without being familiar with the forthcoming French intervention, the government expects the French government to take the consequence of remaining within the European Monetary System and not to set the stage for any renewed uneasiness within the monetary cooperation, Henning Christophersen added.

Minister of Agriculture Niels Anker Kofoed said that the EC Council of Ministers, next Monday, will take a position on a Danish proposal to discontinue the monetary equalization amounts which the member countries are otherwise entitled to following the dramatic monetary meeting in Brussels over the weekend. The other currencies have together been revalued in relation to the British pound, which is outside the European Monetary System, but Henning Christophersen said that it was "absurd" if equalization amounts were to be paid on that basis. To Danish farmers, it would be a question of 1.4 percent at export.

The EC Commission and the Council of Ministers of Agriculture have now been directed to consider other solutions.

Henning Christophersen said that it was of decisive importance for Danish businessmen that the krone did not move away from the D-mark by more than 3 percent. He especially stressed the regard for the agreements just entered into in the labor market, the tacit basis for which had been that the rate of inflation be checked as far as possible.

On the reduction by the Central Bank of the discount rate, Henning Christophersen, Niels Anker Kofoed, and Anders Andersen said that it is "a little more than we had expected." They now expect the rate of interest on loans granted by Danish banks to be lowered, "hopefully by more than 2 percent," which the minister of finance added with a wry smile.

While the EC prime ministers and foreign ministers continued their meetings Monday afternoon and evening, the ministers of economic affairs, on their return home, informed the political parties and trade and business organizations of the content of the monetary agreement reached in Brussels.

Hans O. A. Kjeldsen said that if the EC eliminates the monetary equalization amounts, the agricultural organizations will have to demand increases in EC prices for agricultural products beyond the 7 percent to be proposed at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Agriculture next week.

Kjeld Ejler, director, of the Agricultural Council of Denmark said that yesterday was a costly day for agriculture. He estimated the immediate loss at up to 300 million kroner on an annual basis. Minister of Agriculture Niels Anker Kofoed indicated an amount of 100 million kroner at a press conference.

The various political parties expressed their satisfaction with the currency adjustments.

"The statements made by the parties were to the effect that the decision made was sensible and the right one," Erik Ninn-Hansen, acting prime minister, said after briefing the party leaders.

Knud Christensen, chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions, said that, on the face of it, there is no real basis for revaluing the Danish krone.

"The Danish Federation of Trade Unions would have found it more natural and appropriate if they had at least secured an unchanged Danish krone rate within the EMS," he said.

The Danish Federation of Industries and the Danish Employers' Association expressed their satisfaction with the krone adjustment.

7262  
CSO: 3613/90

**GOVERNMENT: THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR MORE FOREIGN LOANS IN 1983**

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Mar 83 p 1

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] Only 3 months into the year, the Ministry of Finance is able to announce that the state has had its foreign currency loan needs for 1983 covered.

Niels Erik Sørensen, section chief, of the Department for the Management of the National Debt, states that, under the circumstances, the state no longer is in a hard-pressed situation, but that the state, on the other hand, would like to raise additional loans abroad if the loan conditions prove favorable.

"For without any further foreign loans in the course of the remainder of 1983, we shall have to withdraw the undrawn credits of the state during the year, and since we would like to continue to have such emergency loans in reserve, we shall, of course, be interested in raising further loans this year, but, as I mentioned earlier, we are not in any hard-pressed situation."

Niels Erik Sørensen goes on to say that the Danish state, as the first one to do so, is now raising a bond loan in the U.S. capital market at variable interest rates.

The loan is expected to amount to approximately 150 million dollars (well over 1,200 million kroner), the term will be 7 years, and the interest rate will be 0.5 percent above the so-called LIBOR interest rate.

It is a question of a privately placed loan, which involves that the loan will not be quoted on the stock exchange, but that it will be taken over by a small circle of institutional investors in the United States who are expected to keep the bonds issued.

Niels Erik Sørensen, section chief of the Department for the Management of the National Debt, says that the drop in interest rates abroad will rather quickly relieve the pressure on the Danish state finance and the Danish balance of payments:

Each percent by which the interest rate abroad drops will save the state approximately 500 million kroner on an annual basis in interest costs abroad. For the part of the foreign debt of the Danish state subject to variable interest rates now amounts to nearly 50 billion kroner, while the state now has a foreign debt of 3<sup>4</sup> billion kroner at fixed interest rates.

7262  
CSO: 3613/90

**LEFTIST DAILY URGES GOVERNMENT TO EASE FISCAL RESTRAINTS**

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22 Mar 83 p 1

[Editorial: "He Will Wear the Crown"]

[Text] No previous government has probably been as fortunate as the present one. First, it is presented with a decline in international interest rates. Next, with declining oil prices.

And, now: Without abandoning its principle of a fixed krone rate of exchange, it, actually, wins a further prize, viz. the revaluation of the D-mark by 4 percent in relation to the Danish krone. It even looks as if the Danish krone has been revalued, but that, of course, is more of an optical illusion than an actual fact. For it is expected that "the international value of the krone," the average of all currency rates in relation to the krone, weighted in relation to the composition of the foreign trade, will remain unchanged or perhaps even drop by up to 1.5 percent, depending especially upon the position of the U.S. dollar in relation to the D-mark and the other EMS currencies.

The solution to the currency problem found at Brussels will, at least in the short run, bring more stability to the international foreign exchange markets and, probably, also result in a reverse flow of speculative capital, which, to some extent, has been converted into dollars. That is why a certain downward adjustment of the dollar rate, moreover, may be expected. And that would also benefit the hard-pressed Danish foreign exchange reserves situation.

The Central Bank has reacted with a long-awaited reduction of the discount rate, even by 1.5 percent, as a result of which the discount rate is down at a level which we have not experienced since 1979.

There is thus reason for gratification, not least within the government, which may want to give the impression that its policy is proving a success, but which, without any efforts on its part, has experienced another windfall.

However, for this very reason, there is reason to bear in mind the old saying: He will wear the crown who is worthy of it.

And such worthiness is only achieved by taking advantage of the more favorable situation, by reconsidering the severe retrenchment policy pursued by the government. For in order for the somewhat more favorable conditions now prevailing abroad to lead to better conditions in this country, a Danish contribution will become necessary as well.

The basis for a certain amount of upturn is now present. But if the government believes that such a strict financial and monetary policy as it has been pursuing so far will reduce the unemployment rate and cause a marked increase in the rate of production, it is wrong.

The opposition, too, will have to get out of its trancelike state and make an offer as to how it believes that the better prospects may be exploited. For it, too, aspires to wearing the crown.

7262  
CSO: 3613/90

## PROGRESS, PROBLEMS IN GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German  
22 Mar 83 p 2

[Article by goe: "Netherlands: Continuation of Stability Policy"]

[Text] The Hague, 21 March--In the Netherlands, the Center-Right cabinet of the Christian-Democratic Prime Minister Lubbers has been in power for more than 100 days. It spent a great deal of energy on pushing measures to put the financial house in order and on carrying out changes which were promised in the government program. To date many resolutions have been passed--some of them are quite unpopular--and they have been criticized by the respective "affected" party. It is the reason why Lubbers' government received the name "no-nonsense" cabinet, and parliament is faithfully following in its steps. So far it has not had to face any serious problems, and the austerity measures are accepted grudgingly.

But the possibility exists that in the not too distant future difficulties could present themselves as a result of severe tensions due to the problems between the long-range goals (a reduction in the budget deficit, for instance, which is urgently needed) and short-term obligations (tax relief and employment measures), tensions between economic austerity measures and the political will of survival. The test with respect to this question will be adjustments in the current state budget during the next few weeks.

In the view of observers, Prime Minister Lubbers presented a realistic picture of himself and of his cabinet not too long ago when speaking before chief editors of Dutch newspapers. Nevertheless, the cabinet is facing difficult tasks. He had noticed, Lubbers stated, that to the outsider the cabinet was projecting the image that it was constantly occupied with austerity measures and changes in budgetary matters. In reality, however, it was not as bad as it seemed. The corrections are among the most important conditions of his policies. Just as important, however, is the battle against bureaucratization--the so-called deregulation. People had the ambition of continuing the expansion of the welfare state. Everybody was getting fat, so to speak, and suffering from clogged arteries which will have to be cleaned out. A third major point was a different kind of work. In this respect the cabinet had created an additional problem, because it is of the opinion that the community will have to take care of it itself.

At the same time, Lubbers commented on the decline in oil prices. In his opinion, lower oil prices are an impulse for business and for citizens, and a 20 percent decline in oil prices could mean an additional increase in the economic growth of 1 percent. Furthermore, under certain circumstances a decline in oil prices and a reduction in interest rates could lead to a more flexible monetary policy in the Netherlands. On the other hand, however--according to Lubbers--the budget deficit could go even higher, because natural gas prices are tied to oil prices and natural-gas exports would produce less revenue for the state. Additional corrective measures would be required to partially offset this disadvantage. On the other hand, lower prices for imported oil offer some compensation.

As far as Lubbers is concerned, the opposition between the community and politics will not be the primary cause for disappointments but the Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands, which is questioning a number of departure points in the government program. When the cabinet established its three-phase policy, for instance--reduction of the budget deficit, deregulation and improvement of the labor market--it assumed an annual increase in business investments of 11 percent; among other things, it was based on tax relief of 2 billion gulden annually. The Planning Bureau, however--according to a confidential report prepared for the Central Economic Commission (top officials from various ministries)--fears that the increase in investments will only amount to 5.5 percent, in case world trade during the next few years is not going to increase by 3 but only by 2 percent and the domestic and foreign demand remains weak.

According to the Planning Bureau, economic prospects deteriorated also in other areas when compared to the time when the government program was established. Although inflation is expected to drop sharply this year--according to Planning Bureau calculations it will be 2.5 percent, due in large part to declining oil prices--it is not expected that a real moderation in wage increases, down to 2 percent, in business enterprises can be achieved unless there are cuts in nominal wages.

At the end of February, the OECD advised the Netherlands to make extensive cuts in its social outlays. According to the OECD, the Dutch labor market has become stagnant, because in recent years an equalization in income has taken place, and the differences in income are abnormally low between those who are active and those who are not active. Prime Minister Lubbers reacted to the OECD report by saying that the majority of the community in the Netherlands was thinking differently about the solidarity between those who are working and those who are not working and that the assumptions in the report were incorrect. Considering the fact that the economic base is experiencing a contraction, the structure of social security could not simply be removed because it contradicts this feeling of solidarity. But, in spite of it, the Netherlands are doing their best to unseat this sacred cow of social expenditures. During the last few days, for instance, plans were announced to lower the minimum wage for youths or shorten the period during which unemployment compensation is being paid.

The Dutch government also promised to reduce the burden of taxes and levies on businesses. The relief which was announced in the government program is to

amount to between 1.5 and 2 billion gulden annually and is to go into effect at the beginning of next year. The plan calls for lowering the corporate income tax, providing tax relief for newly established firms, additional reductions in the employer's share of social insurance contributions as well as lower taxes for private shareholders.

Orders received: The number of orders received by Dutch industry declined slightly in January of this year for the fourth successive time. It applied especially to the capital-goods industry. According to the most recent economic report by the Statistical Central Bureau, 27 percent of the questioned enterprises reported a decline and 19 percent reported an increase in orders received in January; both domestic and foreign orders registered a decline. 37 (last month it was 39) percent of the companies indicated that the number of orders received was small. Nevertheless, the index for orders received (basis: September 1982 = 100) improved from 93 to 94. From the standpoint of warehousing, 19 (20) percent of the industrial enterprises were too big.

Production: Industrial production in January remained practically unchanged when compared to the preceding month, and it is expected that the level will remain the same until the end of April.

Labor Market: At the end of January, 776,079 persons were registered with Dutch employment services as being unemployed. The number is approximately 11,500 higher than it was at the end of December 1982. (For the new definition see edition of 27 December 1982.) At that time, according to the old definition, 644,191 persons were without work; according to the adjusted new definition, 764,500 persons were unemployed. The unemployment rate was 16.6 percent. Seasonally adjusted, 744,457 persons had no jobs, compared to 615,760 (old definition) or 736,400 at the end of the year, which brings the unemployment rate to 15.9 percent.

Wages and Prices: In January, inflation in the Netherlands came to a standstill. Prices in mid-January, when compared to mid-December, remained unchanged. Price increases took place for 46 percent of the goods and services included by the Statistical Central Bureau; the items were, above all, natural gas, newspapers and magazines, butter, fresh fruit, medical care, water, and radio and television fees. Price reductions were registered for 45 percent of the goods and services listed, above all, clothing and shoes (seasonal sales) and gasoline. At the beginning of 1983, 1980 was established as the base year for establishing price index figures. Until then it was 1975. It is calculated on the basis of goods and services that are purchased by a family (husband and wife without children or with children who have no income of their own) and whose income falls below the limit of the amount which requires mandatory membership in the state health insurance plan (46,550 gulden).

Foreign trade: In December 1982, the Netherlands imported goods in the amount of 15.1 billion gulden, compared to 14.5 billion gulden in December 1981. Consequently, imports rose by 4 percent. Exports, compared to December 1981, also rose by 4 percent, from 14.9 to 15.4 billion gulden. Excluding imports and exports of petroleum, petroleum products, ships and airplanes, because they are subject to strong fluctuations, the value of imports was 4 percent below last year's and the value of exports was 1 percent below last year's.

According to preliminary figures by the Statistical Central Bureau, total exports for 1982 amounted to 167.1 billion gulden, a 2 percent increase over 1981 (164.0 billion gulden). Exports rose by 4 percent to 176.9 billion gulden when compared to 1981 (170.8). In 1980 exports jumped by 16 percent, while imports rose by 8 percent.

8991  
CSO: 3620/280

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

## SOCIALISTS, UNIONS OPPOSE PURCHASE OF BANCA CATALANA

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 10 Apr 83 p 57

[Article by Xavier Vidal-Folch; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Barcelona--The negotiation for the sale of the Banca Catalana group to the Pension Fund (La Caixa), which received a strong boost Thursday when the savings institution's board of directors reached an agreement in principle, has sparked sharp disagreement within the Administration and in the Socialist ranks, and has aroused the open opposition of the two labor organizations, the Workers Commissions (CCOO) and the General Union of Workers (UGT). The /Caixa solution,/ however, continued to move forward yesterday, as a meeting was held in Madrid among the assistant governor of the Banco de Espana, Mariano Rubio; the secretary general of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, Juan Antonio Ruiz de Alda; and the director general of La Caixa, Josep Vilarasau.

The sale of the banking group stock held by the Deposit Guarantee Fund to the Pension Fund has strong supporters in the minister of finance, economics and commerce himself, Miguel Boyer, and in the Banco de Espana, and the control of the entire financial system depends directly on them. The principal argument of those who defend this transaction is that this solution would keep the Catalonian character of the banking group alive, because it is being taken over by an institution headquartered in Barcelona. At the same time, it would comply with the public commitment adopted by the Fund in December to proceed immediately to transfer ownership of the group.

The negotiations, which have advanced in recent days while reports surfaced of other possible alternatives (foreign participation or official credit in a public-sector solution), received a new shot in the arm yesterday when Mariano Rubio, Juan Antonio Ruiz de Alda and Josep Vilarasau met, as reported by Europa Press. At that meeting, the participants began to study the /conditions/ demanded by the Pension Fund to take over Catalana, which are twofold: the expansion of the time periods of the official credit facilities already enjoyed by the banking group, and a precise evaluation of the soundness of the credit assets possessed by Banca Catalana and its subsidiaries.

In opposition to this proposed transaction, major sectors of the ruling party and of the Administration itself argue that refloating the group involves a

high cost to the government, a cost which could be driven higher by the counteroffers that would have to be made to a private buyer.

#### Joan Reventos

Within the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), moreover, it is recalled that the electoral platform explicitly ruled out the possibility that funds would be able to participate in banks' capital. The same difference of opinion can be seen in the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC-PSOE), whose secretary general, Joan Reventos, commented yesterday to EL PAIS that "the solution is not clear, according to press reports." Reventos also stated that "our positions, our general feelings about this matter have already been conveyed to the proper place." This party's rare public positions have always insisted on maintaining the Catalonian nature of the group, but also on an "imaginative" public participation in the ultimate solution.

Other Catalonian Socialist leaders who were more explicit expressed their profound discomfort, detailing several points. The first problem is the /Caixa solution's/ contradiction of the campaign platform. The other arguments lodged by these sources against the transaction are based on the fact that if the group is transferred to the Pension Fund as is, there will be severe losses in its operating accounts, "and if more aid is offered, it is being given a gift, and in that case, why just to one fund and not to all of them, or to other institutions?" They also question whether the compensation for the transaction "would go directly to the banking group or to the fund." Another objection, of a technical nature, lies in the geographic overlapping of the Catalana and Caixa commercial networks. The PSC-PSOE leaders also express regret that, "knowing the Catalonian situation so well," there was no proper consultation to find out what the best alternative would be, "because this is not it."

#### Labor Opposition

The difference of opinion within the governing party becomes radical opposition in the major labor unions. A UGT spokesman reported yesterday that his negative opinion of the transaction will be revealed in a public document in the next few hours.

The CCOO Savings Group, in an 8-point communique, indicated its "vigorous" opposition to the sale, because in its view the move would lead to "the dilution of the distinguishing characteristics that separate funds and banks," and it is "absurd that the salvation and refloating of a banking group should be carried out at the cost of the general public's savings." The CCOO, which attributes the negotiating initiative to "the fruit of an agreement between the director of /La Caixa/ and the minister of economics," indicates that this transaction will pave the way toward "the process of the bankization and privatization of funds," and that the savings institution "would be able to go beyond the Catalonian sphere, evading the regulations that prevent funds from expanding outside their communities of origin."

8926

CSO: 3548/340

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

## CONFIDENCE IN ECONOMY KEY TO NATIONAL RECOVERY

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 10 Apr 83 p 10

[Text] The president of the Spanish Banking Association (AEB) has just painted a rather gloomy picture of the Spanish economy's foreign sector. The predictions in his analysis are radically different from official estimates. The macroeconomic picture presented by the president of the government and the minister of economics and finance calls for the growth of the production of goods and services during 1983—2 percent in physical volume--to be achieved through a major increase in exports and a reduction in imports, thanks in part to the depreciation of the peseta and the decline in international oil prices. That hypothetical improvement of our foreign accounts, that is, the lower balance of payments deficit resulting from a turnaround in current transactions (imports of merchandise and the payment of interest on the debt, on the credit side, and exports, tourism and the yield from reserves, on the debit side), would have permitted a smaller foreign debt and a modest decline in our reserves.

In accounting terms, the government's forecasts called for a current account deficit of between \$2 billion and \$3 billion (less than the \$3 billion to \$4 billion predicted for 1982), and a loss of between \$1 billion and \$1.5 billion in reserves. On the contrary, the AEB estimates the current deficit at about \$4.5 billion, and the loss of reserves, as Rafael Termes insinuated in his report, at between \$2 billion and \$3.4 billion.

It is still too early to know which of the two predictions, the government's or the AEB's, will come closest to the real situation of the balances of payments and trade. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make a statistical breakdown, because the General Customs Office is still working on last December, and the Banco de Espana, whose reports used to be punctual, has been silenced. Thus, the elements of modernity and transparency that knowledge of economic trends provides those who must make rational decisions, seem to be definitely reserved for government officials. Official leaks, however, and the exchange market operators' fragmentary reconstruction of the reserves situation, seem to indicate that during the first quarter some \$1 billion dollars has been lost. This loss, while substantial, is no cause for worry, since in the first months of the year foreign reserves always decline because of lower revenues from tourism. It is, however, very disturbing that the two recent devaluations of the peseta have not had a great impact at the time when

the supply and demand of foreign currency must be estimated. What happened in the first quarter, then, is a very bad omen. Our country continues to live beyond its means, and to buy more than it sells. If there is no confidence in the peseta, Spanish businessmen are reluctant to contract foreign debts, and foreign investors hesitate to exchange their dollars at 136 pesetas when in a short time the exchange rate could be more favorable to them.

Regardless of the government's reasons for concealing the statistics, the predictions point to a more accelerated loss of reserves than was officially foreseen. As long as fiscal policy--with a planned deficit of 6 percent of the gross domestic product--continues to be expansive and nominal pay raises continue to destroy the very possibility of an income policy, the downslide of the peseta will only pave the way for new wage and price hikes, new devaluations in the exchange rate, and ultimately a drain on our reserves.

A brutal, simple and immediate remedy to this situation would be to shut off imports. Now, a measure of this type is impossible because of the international commitments that bind our economy. For this reason, the only imaginable alternative is to tighten monetary policy. Naturally, a rigorous monetary policy implies higher interest rates, which induces people to contract loans abroad, while the shortage of domestic credit affects internal demand and hinders imports. A major change in interest rates would certainly mean that the exchange rate of the peseta would have to come into balance, that is, to equalize the supply and demand of foreign currency. This would be the only way to stop the hemorrhage of foreign reserves, although the price that we would have to pay for the adjustment would be a decline in activity and employment.

The above-described picture is indeed gloomy, but it does no good to close our eyes to a threatening reality while there is still some room for maneuvering to minimize the negative effects of the crisis by making timely decisions. If the AEB predictions turn out to be more correct than the government's, and the drain on our reserves is greater than we can tolerate, economic authorities will have no choice but to retrace their steps and convert their initial expansive optimism into a realistic appraisal of the situation that would necessitate rigorous discipline.

It is obvious that this eventual stabilizing turnaround would entail a political cost for the president of the government and his economic team, obliging them to dampen the enthusiasm of some of their earlier forecasts. Now, if the situation is not rectified in time, within a few months the price could be much higher for the Spanish economy, and the measures required would be even more drastic and painful.

8926  
CSO: 3548/340

## GOVERNMENT WEIGHING FUTURE OF UNPROFITABLE STATE ENTERPRISES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Mar 83 p 28

[Article by Hannu Olkinuora: "Sweden's State Enterprise Administration Model Has Not Withstood Losses; Companies in Critical Condition to Be Dropped from State Enterprise Company"]

[Text] Stockholm—The administration of oil refineries, the steel industry and lumber companies that have slipped from the hands of forest owners to the government has become too burdensome for Sweden's state enterprise parent company.

Those companies in worst shape will be dropped from Statsforetag Ab [State Enterprise Company]. They have caused the parent company, which the government is trying to run according to business economy principles, too much damage. At the same time the parent company will be reorganized and the subsidiary companies will be given greater freedom of action.

The separation of those companies in critical condition is an obvious defeat for the Swedish state enterprise administration model. A system in which state enterprises are tied together under a holding company has in the past been investigated in Finland too. However, in Finland the state enterprises were left independent because it was felt that there was not enough to be gained from having the parent company control quite different kinds of state enterprises. Now Sweden's Statsforetag Ab is to get rid of its biggest and most loss-prone companies: the steel giant SSAB [State Steel Corporation], the northern mining company LKAB [Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara Ab] and the lumber company ASSI [State Wood Industry] as well as the national oil company Svenska Petroleum, founded after the first oil crisis. Svenska Varv [Swedish Shipyard], composed of shipyards that fell into the hands of the state, has for a long time now been freed from such corporate grouping.

#### Big Companies Consumed Too Much Capital

"The Statsforetag combine still includes companies that operate at a loss. The line has not been drawn on the basis of profitability, rather companies have been dropped because they are engaged in such big basic industries. The big crisis-stricken companies have taken too much capital away from the other companies and this has made it increasingly and disproportionately difficult to

administer the parent company," the Ministry of Industry's adviser to the government, Nore Sundberg, explained.

Government adviser Sundberg, who sits on the Statsforetag Ab board of directors and takes care of state enterprises in the ministry, said that those companies engaged in basic industry also require their own professional expertise, which Statsforetag is not equipped for. "We are professionally expert in other fields."

Sundberg denied that even a single state enterprise was to be sold.

"Activity is not an end in itself, but I cannot say that we are contemplating selling anything."

Nor are the Social Democrats extending the state's holdings in industry for ideological reasons either.

#### Separation Was Inevitable

The new Social Democratic second minister of industry, Roine Carlsson, has stated that reorganization of the state enterprises was inevitable because otherwise Statsforetag would not have survived beyond the end of the year. Among the long-term chairman of the Paper Workers Union's first tasks have been the termination of jobs, the acquisition of 4.5 billion kronor and its distribution to the state enterprises.

Statsforetag general manager Karl Erik Ahman has proposed that the foundations of the state enterprises be improved by extending their ownership base. In his opinion, the best companies ought to dig into their pockets. Ownership could also be extended to workers and pension funds through well-directed stock issues.

Silent in public, State Enterprise Industry Minister Carlsson is against turning state enterprises over to the private sector. In his opinion, it would be wrong to first nationalize failing firms and then return prosperous ones to the private sector.

#### Separate Cost Imposed for Employment Services

Statsforetag's general manager wants to get rid of employment obligations imposed on the state enterprises. He has demanded stricter rules in order to act in accordance with business economy principles. He has received the support of the minister of industry.

State enterprises may submit bids to their owner when they have performed services pertaining to the general employment and industry policy. Bids must be submitted at prescribed times and costs are strictly determined. If the job costs more than the estimated cost Statsforetag assumes the risk.

They are trying to increase state enterprises' freedom of action by dividing the parent company into five operational fields, for each of which an operations

manager is responsible. "We are trying to diversify and specialize the companies' activities so that we can avoid organizational rigidity," government adviser Sundberg explained.

#### Too Many Investments

The unloading of those companies it is more costly to carry is the result of an industrial policy in terms of which too much has been invested in the growth of sectors that are in critical shape in the hope of reviving them. Considering their own capital, the state enterprises still expect overcalculated investments to produce results in the lumber industry and the steel mills. On the other hand, no one at all is ready to believe in a future for the mines.

The fact that companies in these industries are kept alive outside the state enterprises is an industrial policy which includes the steel industry and from now on the noticeably curtailed shipbuilding industry.

The fact that the state-owned enterprises' share of investments in the 1970's was greater than their effect on employment tells us something about the success of an industrial policy aimed at preserving jobs. At the Ministry of Industry they do not want to compare the state enterprises with private firms and they are silent on the subject of job forecasts. No one expects jobs to increase in the state enterprises.

With Statsforetag's cleaned-up image, they believe that they can now better control an earlier unknown future.

#### Svensk Skog Ab Planned

Statsforetag lost about 15 billion kronor through the cleanup, about 6 billion in sales volume and its worker complement was reduced by 15,500 workers leaving a total of 27,160. This surgery reduced the enterprises' deficits from 1.8 billion to 400 million kronor. The parent company's deficit was reduced from 1.6 to 1.5 billion.

On the negative side of the ledger, the new arrangement means the creation of two new state enterprise groups. LKAB, which controls Kiiruna, will be managed jointly with the Svenskt Stal [Swedish Steel] steel company.

Only the fully state-owned ASSI, which is a model example of a state enterprise with little of its own money and in which too much has been invested, appears in the first plan for the lumber companies. The forest owners' very unsuccessful NCB [Owners of Norrland Cellulose Forests] and Sodra Skogsagarna [Southern Forest Properties], which the government has had to assume responsibility for, also belong to the state lumber industry.

The state lumber enterprises' biggest problem in comparison with private competitors is considered to be their limited power resources and insignificant forest holdings. Help in solving the lumber problem is being sought from the Swedish Forestry Department's Domanverket [Domain Bureau]. In this way they

would come very close to arriving at a solution they are familiar with in other sectors, that is, the establishment of a Svensk Skog Ab [Swedish Wood Company].

The problems of shipbuilding companies outside of Statsforetag have long been as big as those of all the other state enterprises put together. The shipyards are thoroughly unremunerative.

Getting Svenska Varv into shape would require the termination of thousands of jobs. Nor would that suffice, since the company is left with ships on its hands that have either been stored due to a lack of orders or otherwise remain unpaid for and whose value has tumbled. The value of about 30 ships has dropped by over a billion kronor since they were built and, in light of the prospects for selling them, what they have on the shelves has primarily scrap value. All told, it has been estimated that Svenska Varv needs a total of 4.5 billion kronor.

Statsföretag Ab				
konepajat (1)	rakennus (2)	kemia (3)	kulutustavarat palvelu (4)	kehitys muut (5)
Kalmar Kockum	Nyckelhus	Berol Kemi	Allmänna Bevaknings Ab ABAB	Regioninvest Luossavaara— Kiirunavaara Ab LKAB
Kockumation	Rockwool	Beroxo	BS-Konsult	Statsföretag International Svenskt Stål Ab SSAB
Kockums Industri	Beijer Byggmaterial	Ceaverken	Eiser	Swedish Industrial Development Assi
SMT-Pullmax		Kabivitrum	Liber Grafiska	Svenska Lagerhus Svenska Petroleum SP
Toolbox		ID=Kort (30 %)	Investment Procordia	Svenska Utvecklings Ab
Uddcomb			Sara	Svetab
Sajo Maskin (40 %)			Serva Promotion	Svenska Varv Ab

Key:

1. Machine shops.
2. Construction companies.
3. Chemical companies.
4. Consumer goods and services.
5. Development companies and others.

11,466  
CSO: 3617/89

## KAFAOGLU ON STATE OF TURKISH ECONOMY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 30 Mar 83 p 5

[Text] Minister Adnan Baser Kafaoglu, in an interview covering the questions which have arisen despite the Finance Ministry's statement, regarding how and when the MEYAK [Government Employees Mutual Aid Society] deductions will be paid back, and which also dealt with other topics, spoke about the claims that Turkey is experiencing a hard currency shortage. "There is no hard currency shortage," he said, "we have hard currency reserves of two billion dollars. We are ready to give hard currency to anyone who has work to do. But, I repeat, we are undergoing a shortage of Turkish money."

Minister Kafaoglu said, "A law has been promulgated on the question of how the MEYAK deductions will be paid. This law authorizes the government to fix how and when payment will be made. We, as the Finance Ministry, still have not made the necessary decision on these payments. We did not send it on to the Council of Ministers. We will fix a time period for these payments according to our monetary situation."

Finance Minister Kafaoglu stated, "The MEYAK deductions earlier had been deposited in the Investment Bank and this bank used the money to finance the state economic enterprises." He continued by making the following remarks:

"Now, with this money being collected, we are trying to return to the former method of doing things."

According to Kafaoglu, the price increases were set at "zero" at the beginning of February and he pointed out that in March it was expected that the same situation would continue. He said that he hoped an annual inflation rate of 20 percent could be achieved, however he added that the question of "whether the economy could support" this series of events still is unanswered.

"The importation of fertilizer has been curtailed," Finance Minister Kafaoglu remarked, "except for the varieties of fertilizer we do not possess; there is a sufficient amount of fertilizer produced domestically. We buy fertilizer at high prices and sell it cheaply; we give to our peasants and farmers fertilizer at 10 lira which we bought at 23 lira. This situation is costing us 80 billion lira a year, we are handing out an 80 billion lira treasury subsidy."

Finance Minister Kafaoglu, asked whether the return to concerned individuals of money paid for beets and tobacco and the MEYAK deductions would raise the inflation rate, gave the following response"

"It will not raise the inflation rate because it is not derived from an issue. In other words, the State Monopoly will not give us the money it pays in taxes. The money goes directly to the producer. If money had come from beets and tobacco, we would have given it to the contractors."

"The money that comes to us is not a large amount and it does not exceed the norm. Had it been in great quantity or had it exceed the norm, then at that point prices would have risen and the inflation rate would have climbed. All money spent does not create inflation."

"Now, concerning the MEYAK deductions, when I was retired, I collected 48,000 lira; I received this together with my retirement bonus. You will see that retired people today receive the MEYAK deductions in any case. However, you know there are people who will benefit from the decision of the Council of Ministers concerning the 60 percent payment to those entitled to MEYAK deductions. We will find a way to pay them that will not ignite inflation."

Kafaoglu added that the 300 million dollars requested in the "compensation program" from the World Bank will soon be forthcoming. As is known, if the World Bank extends credit under the name of a "project credit" this money can be used only for the specified projects, however, with "program credits" the recipient government has the authority to use the money wherever it desires.

12280  
CSO: 3554/228

## IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACTING ABROAD TO HOME BANKING

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 30 Mar 83 p 2

[Text] Unemployment, which has reached major proportions as a result of the stagnation brought on by the economic measures used in recent years in the fight against inflation, has become in the world of 1983, the most important question for which all countries are seeking a solution. To achieve the large investment projects which create employment, securing domestic and foreign funds remains important for all nations.

Every year in our country, more than 400,000 new workers are added to the existing labor force and, with our real rate of development, work can be created for only 50 percent of them. Furthermore, because of the economic slowdown, the pressure which our workers in Germany are facing to return home makes it more difficult to solve the problem. Confronted with this situation, it seems mandatory that, first of all, together with industrial investments aimed at exports, projects be started connected with the "industry based on agriculture" investments which raise the value of agricultural products and also that the "foreign contracting services" with their export of labor be stepped up.

## The Matter of Marketing

Our country, from the standpoint of being able to complete its development, is in the position to broaden existing markets and to look for new ones. Now, the question is not to be able to produce goods and services but to be able to market the production in a well-organized way. The middle eastern countries offer much hope in this matter. As is known, in these countries, beginning in 1974 with increased petroleum earnings, construction activities aimed at infrastructure investments gained prominence. Turkish firms, too, entered the industrial construction market in the region that was created in this way. To date, whereas the volume of work our firms have received has grown, there have been important developments, too, in the export of labor to these countries. At first our firms landed construction contracts bound to specific projects, but now, as they have been able to set up the projects, they have begun to establish companies which import a variety of construction materials from our country.

Furthermore, these countries can become large markets for our agricultural and industrial products. Recently, in studies I made in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, I found the opportunity to witness this firsthand.

Today, the Turkish contracting sector, with the qualified workforce it possesses, its organizational capacity and the administrative cadre it has put together, has reached in world standards, a level where it competes, from a technical standpoint, with the contractors of other countries.

It gives one pleasure and pride to see their worksites in foreign lands and to witness, on the spot, the work that they do.

Foodstuffs and agricultural products except for cotton, make up more than 50 percent of Egypt's annual imports worth approximately 8 billion dollars. Cement, automobiles and transport vehicles are other important import items. By giving priority to foodstuffs, especially meat and milk products, it is possible that our exports to this country could reach a large volume in a short time and that we could provide contracting services connected with tourist investments.

Saudi Arabia, which is undergoing a planned and balanced development program, is a market which must be followed closely for contracting services and construction materials exports. Measures such as the strengthening of our contracting firms from the standpoint of capital and credit, the creation of a reporting system that will provide for a permanent accounting of the work that they do and the encouragement of joint ventures with Saudi firms in the areas of imports of goods and services and in banking and investment are able to provide important additions to our hard currency earnings.

#### Conclusion

In step with the economic policies pursued, our export earnings obtained from industrial and agricultural products and the rise in our hard currency income obtained from foreign contracting services and the workers hard currency earnings, the creation of new markets in this area, the broadening of existing markets and the securing of the foreign funds the economy needs; these are various measures closely connected to our banks being turned outward and brought up to an international level. Moreover, it is necessary to seriously pursue the industrial model based on exports and to organize our banks in areas where international trade is concentrated and where foreign funds are active.

As the result of our banks opening abroad and attaining the desired scope, it is without a doubt that we will find the opportunity to provide to our construction firms in foreign contracting services the moral and material support we believe is so necessary.

12280

CSO: 3554/228

POLITICAL

DENMARK

JØRGENSEN CONCEDES SCHLUTER GOVERNMENT NOW FIRM IN POWER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Mar 83 p 1

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich]

[Text] The former prime minister of the Social Democratic Party, party chairman Anker Jørgensen is now preparing the members of his party that it may be some time before the Social Democratic Party will come into power again.

He concedes, at the same time, that the Social Democratic Party will not be able to overturn the nonsocialist government as long as the four government parties stick together and are supported by the Radical Liberal Party and the Progressive Party.

"There must be no doubt that we both want to and will regain the strength of being in power. But from a realistic point of view, it may thus still be some time before this happens," Anker Jørgensen says in an interview with VOR POLITIK, the publication for the membership of the Social Democratic Party.

"As long as the four government parties, supported by the Progressive Party on the one hand and the Radical Liberal Party on the other, are able to stick together, there will be a nonsocialist majority which is able to function. As long as the present government has the majority of the non-socialist parties behind it, it will be these parties that decide the election date," the chairman of the Social Democratic Party says.

Anker Jørgensen denies that the aim of the recent foreign policy positions of the Social Democratic Party has been to overthrow the government.

"The sole reason is that we find it important to mark our positions on the very topical issues regarding East-West detente. This has been seen in the discussion on the missiles and in the discussion on the freezing of nuclear stockpiles in connection with the UN disarmament conference.

We have been saying and still say the same things as we did when we were in power. Therefore, if the four-leaf clover government is outvoted in the Folketing on these issues, it will be entirely up to that government to decide whether it will want to use it as an excuse for issuing writs for a general election," says Anker Jørgensen.

He congratulates the government on the improved international trade conditions and, moreover, announces an investment plan for the economic sector, "which, in practice, will show what we mean when we talk about an expansive economic policy." A new 4-year working program for the Social Democratic Party is also on its way.

The membership publication asks whether it has been difficult changing from being prime minister to becoming leader of the Opposition.

"That is, of course, what the newspapers say. I do not find it difficult, but it has become more difficult spreading our viewpoints," Anker Jørgensen says.

7262  
CSO: 3613/90

## CDU YOUTH LEADER ON PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUTH

West Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in Germany 17 Mar 83 p 3

[Interview with Christian Wulff, chairman of the Youth Union of Lower Saxony: "The Majority Must Not Ruthlessly Carry Through Its Political Will"]

[Text] Taz: You are now 23 years old--what, do you think, should change in the Federal Republic during the next 25 years?

Christian Wulff: As the long-term goal, this society must be further developed, and it seems to be suitable for this. In the internal sphere the role of the state, in the sense of a human society, should be pushed back, the individual should be able to assume more responsibility. This includes the preservation of our environment and a nature rich in species--every day things are happening which do not give sufficient priority to this goal. As far as the outside world is concerned, this would mean the creation of a liberal Europe. This goal has existed already for 25 years, and all too little has happened with respect to it. There must be a decisive change in development policy--the North-South drop will soon no longer be justifiable. Finally, from an existential perspective, the preservation of peace will be crucial.

Taz: What is your first thought in regard to "making society more human"?

Christian Wulff: In human terms, society has become more impoverished. When young people today criticize anonymity, while people have become insensitive to the fate of their next-door neighbor, as well as to the hunger of the Third World, the individual must be more cognizant of his life environment, and people must live more within a foreseeable frame of reference--instead of always calling for the state. In the meantime, all parties after all have come to agree on the rejection of large systems.

## Alcoholics, Drug Addicts and Squatters

Taz: In the "Handbook for Political Argumentation" published by the CDU for its functionaries, there is a discussion--under the entry of family crisis--of childlessness, suicides, drug addiction, alcoholism, and squatting. Does the Union still have any understanding for the younger generation at all? Does the Union not live in the 1950's?

Christian Wulff: This enumeration of "passive" and "active forms of protest" can thus surely be described as undifferentiated. But the loss of orientation and the change of such values as the family plays a role in protest.

Taz: Twenty percent of the population cohabit without marriage, the CDU argumentation aid states without commentary.

Christian Wulff: A broad discussion has begun on precisely this subject, a discussion which aims at the acceptance of realities. A bit more imperturbability in this respect would do the Union a great deal of good. In the legal sphere, the equality of legitimate partnership and a non-legitimate partnership is long overdue. In this matter the free decision of the individual must not be influenced. An increasing number of members of the Youth Union, after all, also live in this fashion themselves.

#### Realpolitik Against Utopia

Taz: Why has there been an increase in the number of young people voting for the Union?

Christian Wulff: The fact that so many younger ones also gave their vote to the Union is due to a confidence in the goals of the Union and combined with the untrustworthiness of the SPD and a certain weakness of the Green Front. In this Bundestag election realpolitik was victorious over visionary politics. The untrustworthiness of the SPD has led to the development of two basic currents among young people: the direction of the Green Front and Alternatives, and on the other hand, that of the Union.

Taz: Does realpolitik mean that one trusts a Minister Lambsdorff and elects a Chancellor Kohl, who demonstrated a very bad memory in the Flick-Affair, and a Strauss, who opposes universal suffrage for South Africa because it would lead to chaos? Does realpolitik at that point not become immoral?

Christian Wulff: Realpolitik means that one takes the needs and concerns of the population seriously and offers solutions. With respect to the Flick-Affair, the Youth Union continues to follow the maxim that in a constitutional state only that person is guilty whose guilt has been demonstrated in a valid manner before a court of law. That applies to supposed terrorists, the Neue Heimat [New Homeland], as well as to Flick. Until then politicians have the right to be treated like human beings.

Taz: Is Strauss' position to South Africa also a question of confidence?

Christian Wulff: There is no higher value than the nation's right to self-determination, and that has to apply to South Africa as well. To that extent the position of Strauss cannot gain a majority in the Union.

Taz: Nevertheless he received 60 percent of the votes for realpolitik....

Christian Wulff: The voters of realpolitik surely saw the entire spectrum, that was decisive for the voting decision: Letting oneself be involved in the future with the risks, but also the chances--in contrast to the rather pessimistic and mixed-up positions of the other parties.

Taz: If the analysis is correct--polarization between the voters of Utopia and those of realpolitik are not facts now being created in the name of realpolitik which are driving at least a third of the younger voters into desperation and revolt? Does the Union want such an explosive separation of society?

Christian Wulff: I see the danger, and its threat as well. The communities in our democracy concerned with important existential questions of principle, have diminished, and the regulations of the democratic association are no longer functioning in all spheres. The minority must accept majorities. There is no higher right, say resistance, that would justify force....

Taz: ...and if through military and civilian use of atomic energy irreversible conditions are created posing a threat to future generations?

Christian Wulff: "...and part of the majority principle has to do, on the other hand, with the fact that the position of the majority must be reasonable as far as the minority is concerned, especially were elementary rights and convictions of a minority are at issue. The majority must not ruthlessly carry through its political will. In the question of nuclear power plants, the Union has come to the conclusion that as few plants as possible should be built, but those that are necessary should be built, among other things in view of the environmental burden caused by the coal power plants. Here the minority has to confront the question of whether--after the people's decision in the elections--it must respect this decision.

Taz: The survey statistics on specific fields of politics frequently appear totally different from the election results. Atomic power surely is rejected by 30 to 40 percent.

Christian Wulff: A government must, of course, take this into account. In doing this the policy of a government can also change majorities. The federal armed forces, entry into NATO at the time were also met with strong criticism at first. That is the political power play. The Green Front has this chance, too.

Less (CDU-) State?

Taz: The members of the Green Front take the CDU slogan about decentralization very seriously, i.e., the opinion of those who are affected locally to a greater extent.

Christian Wulff: In the election district of Lueneburg with Luechow-Dannenberg the Green Front received 8 percent. Another question is the reprocessing plant in Dragahn. For the Youth Union of Lower Saxony it is decisive that the complete municipal council voted against it. According to what we have had in the way of positions up to now, this would mean that the reprocessing plant would have to be built in another region--or be eliminated.

Taz: Do you believe that the information media can be democratized?

Christian Wulff: Monopoly concentrations in the media sphere are always disadvantageous, wherever the Union is strong, through supervisory boards and broadcasting boards, in the sphere of the newspapers, and also where the

SPD is in power. Smaller units, newspapers and radio stations, should have a chance. All of the illegal broadcasting stations in the Federal Republic should be legalized immediately. The technical prerequisites for this are more channels, more frequencies...and this is the path being followed by the Union....

Taz: Is this not tantamount to the introduction of media freedom for Big Money?

Christian Wulff: In the sphere of the media today that is not merely a question of financing; this is demonstrated by the illegal broadcasting stations. There is a considerable market for alternative information. Broadcasting stations under public law could also make time available. Of course, money must not have its way at the cost of pluralism.

8970

CSO: 3620/268

## EANES VISIT TO GREECE ACHIEVES MODEST RESULTS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 19 Mar 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Pedro d'Anunciacao]

[Excerpts] Begun in the midst of almost complete disinterest on the part of the Greek press (only broken when the television authority was directly ordered by the government to give it wide coverage on its news programs), the president of the republic's visit to Greece can be viewed primarily as a courtesy gesture on the part of the Portuguese state.

According to a Foreign Ministry source, this courtesy gesture is, on one hand, aimed at showing Lisbon's gratitude for the support Athens has been giving on the Timor question and, on the other hand, it is to reciprocate President Karamanlis' initiative to strengthen and harmonize the foreign policies of two countries that have many common economic characteristics.

The reception given to the Portuguese entourage was extremely warm but it did not have the animation of the great show or public demonstration, which is natural in a trip of this type.

## Differences Between Karamanlis and Papandreu

Shortly after Gen Ramalho Eanes arrived, official talks were begun in a brief meeting he had with Karamanlis.

The fact that Greece will preside over the European Economic Community Council for the 6-month period beginning in July was apparently viewed as a very important point by the Portuguese Government. Lisbon must have weighed that fact heavily when it set up the priorities for Ramalho Eanes trips abroad. Nevertheless, a Foreign Ministry official who was in the presidential entourage said that it was a detail of relative importance.

As a matter of fact, the most Greece will be able to do for Portugal as president of the Community Council is not to contribute toward blocking the accession negotiations. This appeared to be given assumption right from the start.

Finally, Portuguese officials were a bit disappointed when Karamanlis suggested in his very first conversation with Ramalho Eanes that we be in no

hurry to enter the EEC. Although Portugal and Spain are negotiating separately, he advocated simultaneous membership for both nations.

However, the next day at a lunch offered by Prime Minister Papandreu to the Eanes entourage, the prime minister spoke in favor of a contrary position. He said the EEC is like a club which demands a very high admission fee. It implies high economic costs but these will be repaid fully in the form of political advantages.

The difference of attitudes between the Greek prime minister and president is considered perfectly normal in Athens because of their different party and ideological affiliation (the former is a Christian Democrat and the latter is a Socialist). Constantine Karamanlis also accepts having American bases in his country while Andreas Papandreu is opposed to having them.

With regard to the EEC, Portuguese officials were left with the impression they could count on the Greek's total understanding and support.

#### The Greeks' (Major) Interest

In the meantime, one point is clear and unquestionable, Athens appears much more bent upon and concerned with establishing closer relations with Portugal than Lisbon is with Greece. It does not conceal that it expects Portugal to have united positions later on in the EEC (where it is having serious difficulties) and now in NATO.

NATO was given the highest priority by Karamanlis and Papandreu in all meetings they had with Eanes and Futcher Pereira. The topic is so important to them that the protocol meetings were practically not enough to bring up other problems. It was necessary to take advantage of every instant, even during the receptions, and to schedule new meetings in order to cover what was on the agenda.

Karamanlis insisted strongly with Eanes for Portugal to be less of a follower of the United States of America. However, it was left clear that Lisbon would always adopt the policies defined within NATO completely. Now it is natural that Portuguese officials appear especially sensitive to Greek problems within the Atlantic alliance.

Besides, if it is true that Greece is the one which is more committed to strengthening relations with Portugal, it is also undeniable, as Futcher Pereira pointed out, that both sides have many common interests due to both states' economic and cultural characteristics.

In a conversation Foreign Minister Futcher Pereira had with the Portuguese journalists, he called to mind another facet of Portuguese-Greek relations; despite the political understanding, there are no trade or cultural exchanges.

A cultural agreement signed in Lisbon when Karamanlis visited our country in 1981 should be ratified now in Athens. Moreover, three businessmen who

were part of the entourage (representatives of the Portuguese Industrial association, the Porto Industrial Association and the Lisbon Trade Association) drew up lists of marketable products with their Greek counterparts.

The trade balance between the two countries is currently favorable to Portugal, but it continues at an extremely low level (it does not reach one million contos).

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CSO: 3542/98

## CONTROVERSY ON EANES' ASSOCIATION WITH SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

## Protest Letter

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Mar 83 p 3

[Text] A group of people sent Ramalho Eanes a letter, which was made public yesterday, protesting against the "explicit support" people connected with the office of the president were giving the Conference of Solidarity with the Front Line States. On the other hand, the Ethiopian Peace and Solidarity Committee extolled the importance of that conference which is to be held in Lisbon from 25 to 27 March 1983.

Those who signed the letter sent to Ramalho Eanes consider the above mentioned conference to be "clearly within the ideological sphere that is opposed to the nation's goals". They also declare their "greatest concern" over the recently publicized reports suggesting the president of the republic is "contemplating presiding over the conference's inaugural ceremonies.

The letter reads, "Mr President, your excellency's possible presence at such an inaugural ceremony would be incompatible with the prestige of your position as president of the republic and with the vrey interests of the nation."

The people who signed the letter say they await a denial from the office of the president which "will not only put an end to the innate speculation that results from public indignation as well as the legitimate concerns of the Portuguese."

Some of the people who signed the letter are: Artur Andrade, Alcada Baptista, Sarsfield Cabral, Proenca de Carvalho, Rui de Carvalho, Iva Delgado, Rui Feijo, Rosado Fernandes, Eduardo Figueiredo, Jose Miguel Judice, and Torquato da Luz.

## Eanes' Statement

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 19 Mar 83 p 1

[Excerpt] In statements made to EXPRESSO regarding his support for the Conference of Front Line States (a question that has given rise to a polemic in the Portuguese press), the president of the republic said, "The

conference's objective is to give the Front Line States support on a very specific point: the resolution of the Namibia question and the struggle against apartheid." After Gen Eanes underscored that this is not overall support, he concluded, "Given the definition of these concrete objectives, I could not refuse to give my support."

Ramalho Eanes added before terminating that as he sees it this "does not prevent the continuation of good relations with South Africa. However, those relations will have to evolve within the existing framework."

"On one hand, this means respect for the integrity and sovereignty of all countries, on the other hand, it means continuing our policy of defending human rights and anti-apartheid. Nothing should change our commitment to finding a quick solution to the Namibia problem."

#### Nonparticipation Regretted

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Mar 83 p 2

[Excerpts] To say that the Conference of Solidarity with the Front Lines States is nothing more than an instrument of Soviet strategy is to miss the point in order to (1) get at the Portuguese president and to (2) get at countries which it would be improper (to say the least) to classify as "agents of Moscow". One can speak in such simplistic terms of countries such as Zambia, Tanzania or even Zimbabwe only out of ignorance of political bad faith.

The selection of the Portuguese capital as the site for the meeting is more than a personal honor, it is a recognition that our country can perform an important mediating role in relations between Africa and the West. There is a threat that this may be reduced to a mere declaration of intentions if the governmental practices of each of the parties involved does not correspond with the reality. The association of the president of the republic's name with the conference has not succeeded in dispelling the criticism directed at it. As we saw in recent days, the fact that Ramalho Eanes accepted to be one of the conference's supporters--which does not even mean he will be present at the meeting--merely served to incite his political adversaries' ire against him. The protest sent to Belem by a group of people, the majority of whom are connected with the Soares Carneiro campaign, is good proof of this. The hostile feeling a majority of Portuguese political forces have toward the conference seems to correspond to the opposition surrounding it at the European level. The stated refusal of European socialist and social-democratic parties to having high level representation at this meeting shows that the Socialist International--which is committed to preparing its own conference on Southern Africa that is curiously scheduled to be held in Tanzania, one of the Front Line States--has decided to "drop" the Lisbon meeting. It remains to be seen whether the interests of the European parties will coincide, in this case, with those of the Portuguese parties.

Now, the Conference of Solidarity with the Front Line States will not have the political magnitude that was hoped when the heterogeneous makeup of the

National Preparatory Committee was announced and the parties had not made their refusal to support the meeting, the political parties simply declined to support Soviet strategy in Southern Africa or if they lost a perfect opportunity to strengthen the "privileged interlocutor" status that everyone ascribes to Portugal.

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## POLL RESULTS ON POPULAR ATTITUDES VIS-A-VIS U.S., USSR

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Mar 83 pp 14, 20

[Article by Eduardo Cintra Torres]

[Text] Seven publications, six European and one American, published the results of a poll conducted in various West European countries and in the United States. The questions asked in this March 1982 poll were particularly aimed at finding out European attitudes vis-a-vis the United States and the USSR and in case of war.

The Strategic and International Studies Institute (IEEI) felt it was an opportune time to ask the Portuguese some of the questions in that study in order to find out Portuguese opinion and at the same time compare it with the opinion expressed by their European partners.

Methodology Used to Conduct Poll

Population: individuals 15 years old or older who live in localities of five or more inhabitants in continental Portugal.

Sample size: 2,000 individuals.

Sample selection: The sample was randomly selected within each of the main classes being considered. The class variable were geographical area or region and demographic size or habitat.

Dates in which poll was conducted: between 25 October and 2 December 1982.

Variables: The data was treated according to the following variables: region, domicile, age, socioeconomic class, level of education, sex, and occupation-profession. The tables reproduced here are only broken down by region.

Great Deal of Disinterest in International Questions

The poll TEOR conducted between October and December 1982 categorically confirmed one constant that had appeared in other polls. This was the great disinterest the Portuguese have in international questions even when they are related to how Portugal fits in the world.

The overall level of individuals in this poll who do not know or do not wish to respond to the five questions asked them is about 65 percent. In former public opinion polls the IEEI ordered the same polling firm to carry out, the percentage of those people who did not respond was respectively 26 percent, 70 percent, and 47 percent. This is not a standard typical of IEEI-TEQR polls, which have dealt specifically with defense matters. A quick glance at the public opinion polls conducted in the 10 EEC countries and in Portugal and Spain which were published in EURO-BAROMETRE also point in the same direction.

The no-response level is generally way below 20 percent in all community countries. The exceptions are Belgium and Greece which are at about the 20 percent level. In Portugal it varies between 38 and 69 percent but generally it is above 50 percent.

This lack of interest is not only due to the fact that Portugal is not yet a member of the EEC and that the negotiations are dragging, because in Spain, under the same circumstances, the level of no-responses does not generally surpass one quarter of those being polled.

To us, it also does not seem to be a lack of confidence in polls because even polls on domestic political topics get higher response levels and these increase when the questionnaire is more closely tied with the day to day life of the Portuguese. The polls conducted by DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, for example, have proven this.

If we could venture an explanation, we would choose the simplest one: The Portuguese purely and simply have little interest in international political questions. They do not feel particularly affected by what happens in the political world. Even among groups which one would expect were paying greater attention to international problems (the executives and people with university degrees), their no-response level in this poll is between 24.5 and 31 percent.

The Portuguese do not participate in their foreign policy. Foreign policy has not yet begun to "become democratic" in Portugal as is the case in small and large nations (Holland and the United States for example).

These same observations apply when we compare the results of the current poll with the no-response levels obtained in various European countries and in the United States when the same questions were asked there in February 1982.

The participation is greater than 70 percent in Italy and in Belgium, in France it is greater than 80 percent and it is greater than 90 percent in the FRG and Great Britain. As we noted above the participation in Portugal is around 35 percent.

It is thus difficult to make a detailed comparison of the results--which was one of the IEEI's main objectives. However, it is possible to make a general comparison.

The Portuguese Prefer the United States to the USSR

Asked about their general opinion of the United States, 24.6 percent of the Portuguese were favorable to it and 10.5 percent were unfavorable. The opposite occurs in regard to the Soviet Union, 26.2 percent are unfavorable and only 8.1 percent are favorable.

Opinion favorable to the United States is particularly strong in the north, especially in Porto where 47.1 percent favor the U.S. (in greater Porto the figure drops a bit to 37.9 percent).

Favorable opinion to the United States is much weaker in the southern interior and in greater Lisbon. However, it is higher than the unfavorable opinion.

TABLE 1

	Portugal: Opinion of the United States					Total
	Greater Lisbon	Greater Porto	Northern Coast	Southern Interior	Southern Interior	
Favorable	33.1	37.9	18.5	26.2	13.7	24.6
Unfavorable	20.7	9.4	6.1	6.3	10.4	10.5
Don't Know						
Don't Respond	46.2	52.7	75.4	67.6	76.0	64.9

There is general opposition to the Soviet Union in all the regions, but it is greater in the city of Porto where half of the people interviewed (49.4 percent) had an unfavorable opinion. This is also true in Lisbon (38.5 percent) and the coastal area where the favorable percentage is even lower.

TABLE 2

	Portugal: Opinion of the Soviet Union					Total
	Greater Lisbon	Greater Porto	Northern Coast	Southern Interior	Southern Interior	
Favorable	14.2	8.9	4.6	7.9	6.1	8.1
Unfavorable	35.3	37.2	20.2	26.6	17.1	26.2
Don't know						
Don't Respond	50.5	54.0	75.2	65.6	76.8	65.7

When we analyze the responses by the age and socioeconomic class variables, there is a strong consensus of opinion regarding the superpowers. When the education variable is analyzed, the position of the individuals who have finished high school or have a university degree is much clearer. More than half of these people favor the United States (52.1 and 56.1 percent respectively) and are unfavorable to the USSR (58.7 and 61.1 percent). In none of the variables used were there majorities of opinion that are not the same as those expressed in the totals.

Although, for the reasons already mentioned, it is difficult to compare these results with those expressed in five European countries, one can see

that the Portuguese generally agree with the British, French, Germans, Italians and Belgians.

In all these countries, public opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of the United States.

The difference between the level of favorable and unfavorable opinion is small only in Great Britain (46 percent favorable and 44 percent unfavorable). In other countries, particularly the FRG, the difference is very significant.

The USSR has a very negative image in all countries where the poll was taken.

TABLE 3

Other European Countries: Opinion of the United States  
(expressed in %)

	Great Britain	France	FRG	Italy	Belgium
Favorable	46	55	73	63	49
Unfavorable	44	32	24	21	22
Don't know	10	13	3	16	29
Don't Respond					

TABLE 4

Other European Countries: Opinion of the Soviet Union  
(expressed in %)

	Great Britain	France	FRG	Italy	Belgium
Favorable	14	13	20	13	11
Unfavorable	74	73	77	68	61
Don't Know	12	14	3	19	28
Don't Respond					

Limited Confidence in the United States

Asked about the degree of confidence they have that the United States will handle world problems sensibly, 66.6 percent of those interviewed in continental Portugal did not know or did not want to respond. Of those who did respond, 14.5 percent have the lightest level or a high level of confidence, 11.3 percent have little confidence and 7.7 percent have no confidence.

The results seem to show that a part of those who have a positive impression of the United States now doubt its capacity to deal with world affairs.

Confidence in the United States is prevalent only in northern Portugal while in the southern interior and in greater Lisbon it is small.

When asked the same question (level of confidence in the United States), but this time if they thought that in case of a soviet attack the United States would do everything to defend Portugal, even if it meant the United States was risking being attacked itself, the degree of confidence rose slightly, particularly in greater Porto and in the northern interior.

TABLE 5

	Portuguese Confidence in the United States					
	Greater Lisbon	Greater Porto	Northern Coast	Northern Interior	Southern Interior	Total
Extremely						
High	4.6	4.5	0.3	2.5	2.3	2.4
Very High	11.1	18.5	9.9	17.5	7.8	12.1
Little	22.2	12.9	6.7	9.5	5.1	11.3
None	17.6	9.9	3.5	3.5	4.7	7.7
Don't Know						
Don't Respond	44.6	54.2	79.5	66.9	80.2	66.6

TABLE 6

#### Portuguese Confidence in the United States in Case of Attack

	Greater Lisbon	Greater Porto	Coast	Northern Interior	Southern Interior	Total
Extremely						
High	4.3	4.8	1.2	4.5	2.0	3.0
Very High	13.1	17.5	6.4	13.8	7.9	10.6
Little	10.4	14.5	5.8	6.8	4.8	7.8
None	18.3	6.1	4.4	4.4	5.4	8.0
Don't Know						
Don't Respond	53.9	57.0	82.3	70.5	79.9	70.6

If we go beyond the numbers themselves, we can say that, although the Portuguese understand the world role played by the United States, they do not perceive this role as that of a "European" power by European choice. The international options of the political forces are not public opinion motivation factors, particularly since the side that has been in power since 1976 has, broadly speaking, a similar program in this area. As a result there has been no frequent public debate on the matter.

Because of this, the questions have the same effect on the Portuguese as they do on the citizens of a neutral country such as Switzerland. There the response to the second of these questions showed a lower confidence level than that expressed by the Portuguese. It is understandable that the idea of American aid in case of soviet attack does not have the same sense of urgency in Portugal as it does in those European countries which depend upon American intervention because geography and history placed "in the way" of the Soviet Union. As for the Swiss, they seem to think their neutrality is, as it was in the past, a guarantee against foreign attack. Therefore, American assistance is viewed as unnecessary.

As we saw, that is not the case in other countries. At this time, it is interesting for us to look at Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. In both, the confidence placed in the United States increases from the general to the specific question. This is particularly so in Great Britain where those who have the highest level of confidence or a high level of confidence in the United States climbs from 35 to 56 percent.

TABLE 7

	Other European Countries: Confidence in the United States				
	Great Britain France FRG Italy Belgium				
Extremely					
High	6	4	16	17	7
Very High	29	36	41	36	38
Little	39	35	33	18	20
None	21	12	7	11	10
Don't Know					
Don't Respond	5	13	3	18	25

TABLE 8

	Other European Countries: Confidence in the United States in Case of Attack				
	Great Britain FRG Belgium Denmark Switzerland				
Extremely					
High	20	17	12	17	7
Very High	36	45	34	32	26
Little	28	27	23	25	39
None	12	8	10	11	22
Don't Know					
Don't Respond	4	3	21	15	6

#### No to Soviet Domination

The poll's no-response level decreased significantly only with the last question. It asked if it is better to accept Soviet domination or if it is better to fight in defense of the nation.

Almost half of those interviewed (45 percent) responded to the question. This is a 10 percent increase in the response level of the previous questions.

The number of responses increased significantly in greater Porto and in the northern interior but went down slightly in greater Lisbon.

It can be said then, when asked a question that concerned our country more directly, more people wanted to respond.

The response is almost unanimous: the Portuguese feel it is better to fight (40.1 percent) than to accept Russian domination (4.9 percent).

Broken down by region, we see that the resolve is particularly strong in greater Porto (there is a 12 to 1 ratio of people who prefer to fight instead of accepting domination), in the coastal region and the northern interior the ratio is close to 11 to 1.

TABLE 9

	Portugal: Soviet Domination or Resistance					Total
	Greater Lisbon	Greater Porto	Northern Coast	Southern Interior	Northern Interior	
Prefer Domination	7.0	5.5	3.5	4.4	5.3	4.9
Prefer to Fight	37.0	65.4	39.9	48.4	16.3	40.1
Don't Know						
Don't Respond	55.9	29.1	56.7	47.2	78.4	55.0

The ratio of those who prefer to fight to those who prefer domination is quite higher in Portugal (8 to 1) than in other countries.

This ratio is only surpassed in the United States where the ratio is 14 to 1. Only 3 out of 4 prefer to fight in Italy.

TABLE 10

	Other European Countries and the United States Soviet Domination or Resistance				
	Great Britain	France	FRG	Italy	U.S.A.
Prefer Domination	12	13	19	17	6
Prefer to Fight	75	57	74	48	83
Don't Know	13	30	7	35	11

#### Conclusions

1. More than half the Portuguese people are not informed or are not interested in questions of international politics such as the ones this poll dealt with. Only by establishing a more direct relationship with Portugal's future [or] when the nation's independence is at stake is [interest aroused]. The no-response level is often higher than those obtained in other countries.
2. Generally speaking, the opinions expressed by the Portuguese are very similar to those of the other European peoples interviewed for this poll. They give the U.S. a higher positive rating than the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union is given a higher negative rating than the U.S. In Portugal, the level of confidence in the United States' ability to deal sensibly with the world problems and confidence that it will come to Portugal's assistance in case of attack by the Soviet Union is lower than the European average.

3. The will to resist a possible Soviet attack of those Portuguese who express an opinion is, however, higher than that of other Europeans.

4. The north (greater Porto and the northern interior) and the coastal area are the regions where the opinions expressed are generally favorable to the United States and where the desire to resist in case of Soviet attack is higher.

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CSO: 3542/100

## PSD DEPUTY, CANDIDATE MARGARIDA SALEMA PROFILED

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 22 Mar 83 p 24

/Article by Isabel Risques/

/Text/ Margarida Salema is a 29-year-old deputy in the Assembly of the Republic. She is a lawyer. She played an important role in revising the constitution. She is seeking re-election as a PSD /Social Democratic Party/ candidate in the upcoming legislative elections. Margarida Salema is Helena Roseta's sister; she is married and has a daughter. For her, being a member of parliament is a challenge she has taken up and wishes to continue with, even if she has to struggle against the machismo tendency that, in her opinion, dominates parliament.

Margarida Salema is a 29-year-old lawyer who has been a deputy in the Assembly of the Republic since 13 November 1980. She is seeking re-election as a deputy in the upcoming elections on the PSD's Lisbon ticket. She was the only woman who actively participated in the constitutional revision committee. Next to nothing has been written about her experience and political contribution.

She revealed to us in a consistent manner part of her struggle and her participation in national politics, which she began when she was only 22 years old.

The young lawyer, who is "extremely scrupulous in everything", has been raising her determination to the level of her abilities. The ambiance of deceit and make believe surrounding her has not forced her to give up, although she does admit she feels a certain "disenchantment".

Margarida Salema asked to have her mandate as deputy suspended on 3 January in order to devote her time to preparing a paper for a law-political science post-graduate course at the University of Lisbon's law school.

In a manner that is full of life and realism that contrasts with our dream-like and make believe daily life, the young lawyer confesses to having returned to her law practice "in order to subsist" and at the same time she says,

"parliamentary experience is interesting". However, she underscores that this work "should be carried out in the most exclusive manner possible."

"I rarely missed a session. I made it a point to be present and to contribute with dignity." She added, "This is not possible now. I felt I should not attend assembly sessions twice a week."

Margarida Salema was a member of the parliamentary committee that revised the constitution and prior to that she collaborated in Francisco Sa Carneiro's work "A Constitution for the 80's". In an introductory note, Sa Carneiro called her contribution "valuable."

Margarida Salema was recently asked to become a judge in the Constitutional Court but she turned it down because she did not feel she was "old enough or had enough ability to hold such an important position."

However, she describes herself as being "29 years old but having the mentality of a 60-year-old!"

She is currently a member of the Cascais municipal political committee and a delegate to the district assembly for the Lisbon metropolitan area.

This aside, she does not forget she is a woman and "feels the weight of that responsibility" and the difficulties she has had in order to make others accept her in politics. She told us, "Machismo is everywhere, it is also in the Assembly of the Republic.

The percentage of women deputies does not exceed 9 percent. Margarida Salema expressed her opposition to this state of affairs. "What a disgrace! The percentage of women in parliament is shameful and lamentable. Legal measures can be taken to have a higher percentage of women on the electoral lists for deputy. However, I have doubts concerning the real effects of that type of legislation."

In her opinion, it is also incumbent upon women to impose themselves in order to achieve certain positions.

When the legalization of abortion was being debated, Margarida Salema did not vote on the bill for reasons of conscience.

The PSD militant said in this regard that she is a "practicing catholic" and "it makes no sense to pass a law which will offend 80 percent of the Portuguese people." She feels, however, that "the abortion debate has not come to a head yet" and, she said, "I do not take sides in simplistic debates on this subject."

Margarida Salema is married to 26-year-old Jose Vilar Ribeiro, the manager of a firm. The couple has a 4-year-old daughter, Joana.

She married 6 years ago, lives in Cascais and is Helena Hoseta's sister and Antonio Capucho's sister-in-law. This unusually frank, direct and outspoken "disciplined militant" has a normal family life. She is "super tidy" but does not "like to nor has the nack to cook."

One of her preferred hobbies is to sing and play the guitar. Nevertheless, time permitting, she likes to "hit a tennis ball around a bit and to ride a bicycle."

Margarida Salema's political activity also includes membership in a United Nations' committee on the elimination of discrimination against women ("this is my international facet").

Her struggle is constant but her disenchantment is real: "There are certain ideals that, for insignificant reasons, cannot be achieved later on."

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CSO: 3542/105

## TXIKI BENEGAS BLASTS UNETHICAL PNV LEADERS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Apr 83 p 11

[Text] San Sebastian--The secretary general of the Socialist Party of Euskadi [Basque Country] - PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], Txiki Benegas, yesterday accused the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] of not collaborating in the fight against terrorism and of stipulating conditions under which it would do so in the future, in response to the nationalist document released Saturday. In a note distributed by his party, Benegas declared the following: "When a party, up to now the leading one of the autonomous community, a community of which more than 400 persons have been victims of terrorism and thousands of extortion, and when the lives of people who have been kidnapped by terrorist organizations are in present danger, when that party stipulates the conditions stipulated by the national council of the Basque Nationalist Party under which it will collaborate in the fight against terrorism, it means that its leaders have failed to grasp the ethical significance of politics, of the value of human life and that, with their attitude and conditions, they are indirectly justifying violence among our people."

The socialist leader stated pointedly that at this juncture of the democratic process there is neither anything nor any reason that can justify the non-collaboration of a democratic party in the effort to put an end to the violence in the Basque Country." Benegas said that "all this is inadmissible, serious and discouraging for the future of the governing party in the Basque Country, although I am convinced that a large segment of the affiliates and voters of the PNV are eager to hear a message of another sort from the nationalist leaders so that the shedding of blood in the Basque Fatherland may come to an end."

In the judgment of the socialist representative, when the PNV speaks of the withdrawal of the civil governors in the Basque Country, of the LOAPA [Organic Harmonization Law for the Autonomous Process] or of the development of the Autonomy Status as conditions under which it would be willing to collaborate in the fight against terrorism, "not only are they looking for excuses for not meeting ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] face to face, but they are doing something more serious politically: they are taking advantage of the existence of terrorism to lay their political claims before the

government of the state." In Benegas' opinion, the PNV is acting more like a party that must rule like a "resistance movement" that has chosen the route of confrontation with the socialist government, without taking into account that the latter is not going to yield to any attitude "in which political claims are set as the price for collaboration in the fight against terrorism."

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CSO: 3548/321

POLITICAL

SPAIN

SOCIALISTS' DOMESTIC, FOREIGN TRACK RECORD BLASTED

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 3 Mar 83 p 8

[Commentary by Juan Blanco in column "Cronica de Espana": "Farewell Socialism Farewell"]

[Text] What had to happen, happened--that is, the disaster of this government--which is starved for intelligence, short on preparation, and lacking the maturity--that "the-Spanish-people-took-on-for-themselves", as a demonstration that the Spanish people tend to frequently commit blunders, in support of that line of Lope about the theater. And now here we are at the catastrophe, after being surrounded by lies, and you should see what official channels were saying about the absence of panic among depositors in the banks that were seized and what happened afterward when the private banking institutions spoke up.

Forty billion pesetas--without counting the Andalusian banking offices--took off in just one morning; and wait till you hear more! It was partly the fault, of the journalists, who believed we would find ourselves on Monday in the year 1929, when 1929 will actually begin, more or less, at the end of this first year of the Left, the big change, and "Spain's own mother will not recognize her", such delicate words spoken by a socialist big shot on a historical occasion. What but this were we to expect from a government of turkeys nurtured by don Fernando Abril Martorell, Mr Duke of Himself; don Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun; don Manuel Gutierrez Mellado; don Inigo Calvero; don Juan Jose Roson Perez; don Francisco Fernandez Ordonez; my adored dona Soledad Becerril; and the whining husband of my lady dona Juanita, whose white hand I will kiss when the beginning of the end comes for the "socialist boys".

Meanwhile, Don Fernando Moran, never discouraged, is preparing to leave for Strasbourg to receive instructions for us to eat our textiles and steel, prepare the commune workers for the take-off of a large part of the olives, oranges, vines, and other Mediterranean crops, turn our fishing boats into gay "motorboats" for beach trips for the down-at-the-heel tourists Europe sends us, and open our borders to the triumphal influx of excess industrial goods from our neighbors, the fish they do not let us fish for, and the machinery they do not let us produce. The Minister of Foreign Snubs is like

that.. When it is least expected he will negotiate about Ceuta and Melilla, to heed the campaign of the middle-level communication officials, and will withdraw the restrictions on free flow of persons and goods between the Andalusian "nation", whose culture is older than the Catalan, as don Rafael Escuredo has recently told us, and the British nation represented on the colonial Rock. Don Fernando returns from Italy, Don Fernando always flits through, where they have reminded him that, of course, they support our entry into the European Economic Community, but that we must "take a good look at some problems" the principal one being "the imbalance in the common agricultural policy, which leaves Mediterranean products exposed." And don Fernando goes back contented and happy, thrilled that he has been able to "satisfy his long-standing wish to lunch with the president of the republic, Alejandro Pertini."

Those lunches of our socialist ministers, dear reader, are expensive now that the restaurant bills in Strasbourg are charging us that 15 percent cut in fishing in Community waters. Our European friends have the menu and the bill ready for don Fernando Moran and his beloved disciple Manuel Marin, a sweetment, that one, for the wild boars of the Community, the correspondent of a Madrid newspaper tells us, who quotes one of them with this consoling statement, "The Spanish Government is between the sword (he says sword, notice, not saber!) and the wall. It must accept a new decrease in its fishing or be entirely prohibited from fishing in EEC waters", take it or leave it, we are going ahead. In spite of the fact that all Europe joyously welcomed the peaceful transition, it was hindered by tension from the political regime... the-Spanish-people-took-on-for themselves then came the paroxysm with the new government that the-Spanish-people-gave-themselves through the loan of 3.5 million votes to don Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, and reached the pleasures of Paradise with the progressive ethics and morals of socialism. Everything is going well, however. Don Fernando Moran says he is "enormously satisfied" that, note, the relations with Italy are so good they "cannot be improved", and that "we ought to enter (the EEC) during the first half of 1984" because during that period there is a French president and I think it would be a favorable time."

"To each his own" is the name of the kind of optimism of our Minister of Foreign Snubs, who these days is racking his brain to cooperate with the rest of the cabinet in the search for a new ambassador from Spain to France, who "will not be a career diplomat", he could do worse considering the administration of diplomatic relations with France", a definition of the new ambassador and the relations with France that, I swear to you, has been made in absolute seriousness and with no trace of irony. Good God and take a look at ministers, such as the minister of extravagance, deceit and foreign deficit announces to us that we must now file a declaration of income and explains to us that the "fare" is one going up 5 percent.

Of course the money has to come from somewhere to pay the subsidy for all the thousands of new unemployed the socialist administration has brought us.

Note: The PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] [signed: Juan Blanco]; the Basque Government, supports the central government in its proposal that military service should take place in the area of residence.

The PNV, the Basque government, supports the central government in the Rumasa case.

Herri Batasuna is announcing that the "peace table" could be called together after the municipal elections.

Even don Luis Apostua, "expert in general subjects" would catch on to what don Carlos and don Felipe are doing.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

OFFICIAL SILENCE ON PURPORTED SOVIET EXPULSIONS

Expulsions, Common Market, Gibraltar

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Apr 83 p 1

[Text] Spanish and Soviet diplomatic circles in Madrid are all but mute regarding the purported expulsion of four officials attached to the Embassy of the USSR, who have apparently been accused of performing tasks involving espionage. While Spanish diplomatic sources state that they know of the expulsion of only one official and nothing about the other three, the Soviet Embassy goes no further than to say: "we have no information in this regard." No member of the Diplomatic Information Office could be contacted in recent days to supply the Spanish version. The silence extends as well to the names, ranks and official activities of the persons purported to have been expelled.

Even Fernando Moran, minister of foreign affairs, in statements made to the newspaper LA VERDAD of Murcia, said only that there had been an expulsion. "The recent expulsion of a member of the Soviet Embassy has been carried out because the individual concerned was performing tasks unrelated to his diplomatic status," Moran stated.

The minister, who spent 2 days on vacation at the home of Jose Luis Pardos, general manager of International Corporation, in Cieza, a municipality of Murcia, adds that "the measure was taken to demonstrate the Spanish right to defend our sovereignty and security, although it has not been our wish to create a scandal and I do not expect that there will be reprisals on the part of the Soviets." The minister believes that relations with the USSR are good, but he adds: "What is happening is that these relations are not extremely active and we are going to attempt to get them off to a new start, in spite of the differences between the postures of the two countries. For example, we are already taking the first steps to improve the agreements on marine shipping and I will be going to Moscow at the end of May to implement this new start of which I am speaking."

As regards the entry of our country into the Common Market, the minister expresses the opinion that it will become a reality in 1985 and, in the matter of the return of Gibraltar by the British, he states: "I believe that Gibraltar will be Spanish during the course of this generation and I can

add that within the decade of the nineties there will be a great step forward in this matter." Diego Vera reports from Murcia that Moran, who, in referring to his recent conference with Margaret Thatcher, British prime minister, says that she is "a top-flight politician" and is a true statesman, expresses his hope that the United Kingdom will adopt a more flexible posture with respect to the Rock: "we will try to convince the British to accept any type of negotiation to open a discussion of the topic of sovereignty to find a formula that will give the same rights to Spaniards and to the people of Gibraltar."

#### Limited Publicity

With respect to the measures taken involving the Soviet officials, the general impression is that the diplomatic authorities are trying to lessen the impact of the expulsions, since within less than two months' time, Moran will be paying an official visit to Moscow in an admitted attempt to give new impetus to economic and diplomatic relations with the East. Therefore, according to diplomatic circles, an agreement has no doubt been reached with the authorities of the USSR to avoid giving undue publicity to the matter and turning the departures of the four members of the Soviet Embassy into cases of expulsion for espionage.

Thus, despite the fact that the four are said to have left Spain as early as last week aboard an Aeroflot plane, an effort is no doubt being made to explain the measure as the result of a simple "recommendation" on the part of the Spanish authorities and not as a formal expulsion.

Moscow's interest in avoiding widespread publicity of the measure taken by the Spanish government, presumably on recommendation of the special services of the CESID [Higher Center For Defense Intelligence], is apparently heightened by the fact that a similar step was taken last week by the British Government: on Thursday the Foreign Office obliged Igor Viktorovich, a journalist, and Primakov, military attaché, to leave the United Kingdom for purported espionage activities.

The most recent "official" expulsions of Soviet officials in Spain took place one year ago and involved two executives of Aeroflot.

#### Silence on Purported Expulsions

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Apr 83 p 15

[Text] Official Spanish circles as well as the Soviet representatives in Madrid are maintaining complete silence with regard to the purported expulsion of four officials of the USSR, who are said to have been accused of performing tasks of espionage. Spanish diplomatic sources yesterday stated to this newspaper that they know of the expulsion of only one official and nothing about the other three mentioned in various reports. A representative of the Soviet Embassy said only that "we have no information in this regard."

No member of the Diplomatic Information Office could be found in recent days to supply the Spanish version of this matter. The silence extends as well to information on the names, ranks and official activities of the persons who have been expelled. Even Fernando Moran, minister of foreign affairs, in statements made to the newspaper LA VERDAD of Murcia, said only that there had been an expulsion. "The recent expulsion of a member of the Soviet Embassy was carried out because the individual concerned was accused of performing tasks unrelated to his diplomatic status," Moran stated.

According to different impressions gathered, Spanish authorities are trying to lessen the impact of the expulsions, which occurred at the precise moment when, within no more than a few weeks, Moran will be paying an official visit to the Soviet Union.

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## PCE'S IGLESIAS ON CAMPAIGN ROAD FOR MUNICIPALS

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 25-31 Mar 83 pp 15-17

[Text] For Gerardo Iglesias, Friday, Saturday and Sunday were a veritable political marathon that took him from one end of our peninsular geography to the other. On the 18th in Jaen, in Murcia on the 19th, and Sunday, the 20th, in Euskadi, the secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) directly explained to the workers and citizens the position of the party and its most immediate plans of action in the face of the municipal and autonomous elections and in view of such important topics as world peace or the withdrawal of Spain from NATO. With reports from our correspondents in each of the points mentioned, Concha Caballero, Andres Salom and Martin Saenz, we have prepared the report of this triple-day activity, which continued Tuesday, the 22d, in Alcala de Henares but the deadline for this edition did not permit us to cover that last meeting.

The tour began with a dark story, a crude trick played by the managers of the Santana firm of Jaen, who did not permit Gerardo Iglesias to enter the factory and talk to the workers in their own work place. Nor did they permit the workers to leave their work for a few minutes to meet with the communist leader outside the company, and all of it, according to them, to preserve the purity of the election campaign period, as if the election campaign periods were not precisely the most appropriate for the politicians to speak in public. And that, without counting the fact that those same doors were open on a previous occasion for Fraga.

In any case, Gerardo was with the workers in Santana. Wearing their work overalls and with sandwiches in their hands, many took advantage of the change in shift to gather around the communist leader.

#### Criticism of the Government

In the presence of the workers, on an improvised platform, Gerardo Iglesias spoke of the class unity needed to cope with the crisis and unemployment. A unity which he reiterated later in his visit to the olive cooperative COOSUR, the Linares city council and at the press interview given later. "The worst thing that could happen to this country," he said, "would be for society to demobilize, to cease to concern itself and stop participating and demanding. If that should occur, not only would change be impossible but

democracy itself would stagnate." At the same time, the secretary general of the Communist Party of Andalucia (PCA), Felipe Alcaraz, who accompanied him on his tour over the lands of Jaen, dwelled on that same basic idea when he congratulated the community service workers for their mobilizations, which have had great repercussion throughout Spain in recent days, and encouraged them to continue their struggle against the underlying causes of farm unemployment and to insure that complete agrarian reform, which is an urgent need throughout Andalucia, is carried out.

In the final meeting of this stage, held in the town of Torredonjimeno, Alcaraz himself emphasized that such mobilizations do not represent a challenge to the PSOE government: "We are not antisocialists but neither are we socialists. We are communists and we represent the Marxist Left; what we seek is the definitive transformation of society, without agreeing to mere reformism."

And immediately afterwards, in the midst of the applause of the more than 3,500 persons present at the gathering, Gerardo specified the position of the party with regard to the performance of the PSOE government: "Is it that the Socialist government cannot be criticized? Isn't it our obligation as an independent party to criticize what is not progressive? If we did not do so, we would let criticism be made only by Popular Alliance. Eleven million Spaniards have said "yes" to the change, and that represents a great popular force of progress on which we have to rely, and that has to regain a leading position and mobilize to check the reactionary powers that oppose the progressive measures the government may take. If the people stay home and keep quiet, that will not help change at all. For that reason, our criticism has nothing to do with that made by the Right, nor does it benefit the Right at all."

#### Against the Escalation of NATO

The following day, in Murcia, Gerardo Iglesias logically reiterated this key idea for the communists at the meeting in which Dr Elvira Ramos, candidate for mayor, and the secretary general of the Communist Party of the Murcia Region (PCRM), Pedro Antonio Rios, also spoke.

"The government," he declared, "is only part of power; banking, the CEOE, the most reactionary Church and the most degenerate forces in general are also powers." And after explaining that, contrary to what some have said, the actions of Gijon and Sagunto were not harassment of the government, he reiterated the PCE's sincere wish to support the executive headed by Felipe Gonzalez in whatever progressive measures he may take.

Nevertheless, the communist secretary general asked himself why the PSOE did not convene all social forces with a desire for change, as are the parties of the Left, the unions and various associations, to make a joint effort to consolidate democracy. "All the changes in a progressive direction that have been made in history," said Gerardo Iglesias, "have been made when the institutions have had the whole people behind them. Just as all the regressive changes have taken place after a great demoralization of society."

Embracing the concrete problems of the region, Pedro Antonio Rios pledged that the communists would fight to prevent the port of Cartagena from being converted into a NATO base and rather into a base for the shipment of export products. Thus, a week of great activity by the PCRM was culminated in Murcia, carried out basically on the occasion of the centennial of the death of Karl Marx.

The campaign of the Basque communists in commemoration of this date served as the framework for the first visit made to Euskadi by Gerardo Iglesias as secretary general of the PCE. After holding a press conference in Bilbao, he went to the municipal "fronton" of Sestao where the main rally of his trip to the Basque Country took place.

Three thousand members of the audience welcomed his presence with an ovation; he was flanked by Ignacio Latierro, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party-Euskadi Communist Party (PCE-EPK) and Tomas Tueros, who is secretary general of Workers Commissions (CCOO) of Euskadi.

Ignacio Latierro called for the end of the ancestral differences between the Basques, basically divided between the followers of Sabino Arana and of Facundo Perezagua, to seek a Euskadi cemented on the collaboration of all democratic forces. "We need to combine the struggle for freedom and socialism," he pointed out, "with the struggle for national sovereignty. Be we are not going to renounce defending that policy from our watchwords of class identity and as a Marxist party." Finally, Latierro announced the firm purpose of the Basque communists to work to maintain the industry of their nation because to save that industry, today in tremendous decline, is the only way of creating jobs.

Gerardo Iglesias also referred to the particular problems of the Basque Country and trenchantly condemned terrorism, declaring that it was part of the same strategy as coupism. With regard to the general situation in Spain, he criticized the political trends toward bipolarization and the intent to make Fraga appear as the inevitable solution in exchange for the PSOE. "It is necessary," he declared, "to make the 11 million votes that the Left received carry their real weight in the real world; it is necessary to mobilize the workers to achieve progressive solutions for the crisis we are traversing so that, as a last resort, the alternative to the Socialist government may not be one of the Right but another more socialist government."

In his speech, he also explained the position of the Spanish communists in view of the recent election results in Germany and France, where the conservative victory seems to fit into that dynamic of alternation that does not leave the way open to carrying out real transformations in society and that is a pendular model which we reject. In this regard, declared Gerardo Iglesias, it is not enough to use a parliamentary majority, it is necessary to give a leading role to the electoral majorities. In conclusion, the secretary general of the PCE warned his listeners against the dangers of nuclearization (the Basque people have shown themselves to be especially sensitive to atomic bases) and reiterated the communist opposition to the international policy of military blocs.

The departure from Euskadi was a very tasty one for Gerardo, thanks to the Basque tradition in the gastronomic area, which resulted in the farewell being bade to him in Basauri at a symposium-dinner with the attendance of professionals and intellectuals. The good taste of Basque cooking may well have taken the bad taste out of the communist leader's mouth left by that trick of the Santana management at the beginning of the trip.

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## ANALYSIS OF FRAGA TACTICS TO REGAIN RIGHT

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 21-28 Mar 83 pp 24-25, 28-29

[Text] Fraga's Secret Objectives: Alliance's Manuel Fraga has launched an operation that has as its goal ratifying him as leaders of the Right to force early general elections in 1985. Christian Democrat Oscar Alzaga is watchfully riding on Fraga's back. Adolfo Suarez, Miguel Roco and Antonio Garriques are anxiously waiting for an election debacle by Fraga in May. It is the horses of the Right against Socialist power, with their strategies, secret objectives and mysterious mantling pacts; for example, those that Fraga has drafted with the nationalists Xabier Arzallus and Trias Fargas. TIEMPO has talked at length with the main principals of the story and traveled with Fraga to the Basque Country.

Fraga's first objective is to break that jinx that his election possibilities have a ceiling that he can never reach to defeat the socialists. If the Alliance leader does not succeed in surpassing his 26 percent of the last general elections in these local and regional elections, the "vultures" of the Right will swoop down on him to replace him in the leadership. And he is aware of that.

Fraga looks upon the 8 May elections not as a second round of the general elections to calculate the degree of erosion of the socialists but as an authentic ratification of his leadership in the Right.

On that basis, Fraga has prepared a strategy on three fronts: expand the coalition of the Right with new agreements, initiate a strong offensive for the erosion of power and especially of President Felipe Gonzalez, and bring about early elections in 1985.

The Alliance spokesman in the Congress of Deputies, Miguel Herrero de Minon, is a key piece in this operation and his participation in the Rumasa debate, harshly attacking Gonzalez--in orchestration with the later participation of Miguel Roca--was only a sample of which way the shots will be going in the next few months.

It was Miguel Herrero himself who, in a 5-hour luncheon meeting at his home in Madrid last week with nationalist leader Xabier Arzallus, reached an agreement on common objectives vis-a-vis the Socialist government. The Basque nationalists did not support Felipe Gonzales in the Cortes on such specific topics

as the constitutional court or the renewal of directors in the Directorate General of Spanish Radio and Television (RTVE), while the Alliance people line up with the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in the autonomous parliament of Vitoria.

But these are only the first ripples for pacts of greater scope that will culminate in fact in a common front of opposition to the Gonzales cabinet; a theory of direct opposition to the socialists which, since the first moments of the victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), nationalist leader Xabier Arzallus has considered more favorable than the line begun by his party comrade and president of the autonomous government, Carlos Garaicoechea.

Following the Arzallus-Herrero de Minon meeting, which was able to prevent the fall of the Basque executive, collapsed by the opposition of the leftist bloc in the Vitoria parliament, Fraga was tough with his people in the Basque Country, threatening them to accept this strategy of rapprochement with the nationalists for the sake of higher interests.

The PNV and the alliance of the Right in the Basque Country are not just competition for Alliance weakness, while this operation can yield Fraga greater successes in the Cortes and for his over-all national strategy.

The operation is so complex and sensitive, in which the toughest confrontations have occurred between the rank-and-file and the leadership of both Alliance and the PNV, that some leaders of the coalition headed by Fraga in the Basque Country have made an effort to influence the media to soften the impact of this information.

"Our positions are very far from the PNV but we hope that the PNV will shorten them. We are charterists [foralistas]. Sooner or later, realism will prevail; when the PNV passes from radical nationalism to a deep regionalism, that is where we will meet," Fraga announced in Bilbao. It was in the Biscayan town that he warned the more obstinate of his people to accept the pact, that "that is politics: to accept the least bad solution."

During his tour of the three Basque capitals, Fraga established the lines of understanding with the nationalists on the basis of the common defense of a model of society.

The Alliance leader has identifical plans for the Catalan nationalists for after the municipal elections. After the failure of his negotiations with the spokesman of Convergence and Union (CiU) in the Cortes, Miguel Roca, before the last general elections to form part of the "great Right," contacts have now been resumed with the candidate for mayor of Barcelona, Ramon Trias Fargas, whose disagreements with Roca are well known.

#### Fraga Wants to Ratify His Leadership in the Right and Elections in 1985

Trias Fargas invited Fraga to lunch in the Jockey Restaurant of Madrid a month ago to establish the bases for a coordinated opposition against the socialists. After what was discussed there, an understanding exists between Trias and Fraga

but tactical reasons advised delaying the written pact until the results of the local elections are known. In Catalonia, Fraga is a force on the rise, while the nationalists of Jordi Pujol have greater difficulty in maintaining the hegemony of power.

According to the information that has filtered out of the aforementioned meeting between Trias and Fraga, the Catalan leader had reportedly warned the Alliance leader that the operation of a reformist center at the national level that Roca plans to head does not have any substantial support within the CiU.

Roca has definitely postponed launching his operation until he also knows the results of the municipal elections. If Fraga does not rise with reference to the results of last 28 October, or if he drops, then he [Roca] will relaunch his leadership. Otherwise, his plans may change.

In view of Roca's haste, Fraga and former President Adolfo Suarez, leader of the Democratic Socialist Center coincide on some keys of the analysis and strategy. The Alliance leader and men around him, such as the secretary general of the Popular Alliance and candidate for mayor of Madrid, Jorge Vestrynge, already regard as inevitable the existence of a swing party that from the center will carry part of the 3 million votes that went to Felipe Gonzales in the last elections from that political option. And they agree that Suarez is the natural leader to head that group.

For his part, Suarez, who understands the growth of the Right headed by Fraga as something natural that responds to the sociology of the country, considers any operation by Roca to rebuild the center, or any other attempted so soon after the resounding fall of the Democratic Center Union (UCD), as doomed to failure. Suarez is preparing the consolidation of that swing party in the longer term, as the option of a radical party.

But, in conclusion, Roca as well as Suarez and Garrigues are waiting to make their moves to see if Fraga comes a cropper or continues his upward race at the polls. Whether they can have more or less operating space depends on these results. For that reason, they have asked President Gonzalez not to "install" Fraga as leader of the opposition through a special statute. The Duke has reiterated it to Gonazalez on various occasions during the long talks they have in La Moncloa in private.

#### Garrigues in the Race

Garrigues has finally launched himself into the politics of real competition, announcing his candidacy for mayor of Madrid. Pushed a little by his party and also to try to verify the political space that the liberals among the PSOE the AP may have.

On Tuesday, 15 March, Garrigues met with Suarez to ask him to desist from presenting a candidate for mayor of Madrid, leaving the liberal leader the open field of the center. But Suarez is not disposed to make such concessions with the well-advanced preparations indicating Rosa Posada for the candidacy.

Garrigues does not want to detach himself from the operation that Roca may put into operation after the municipal elections but he intends first to reevaluate his position.

"This is a deep race where one has to hold out and work without scuttling," Suarez is accustomed to saying in private.

The Duke's philosophy is the same as Fraga's. The Alliance leader, at all costs, needs to rise several points in the 8 May elections to stifle the alternative operations that emerge alternatively to lead the Right. Fraga considers these as trial balloons and personal erosion maneuvers stemming not only from political circles but also from the business area.

If in these elections, Fraga does not succeed in breaking through the ceiling reached until now, which does not in any way guarantee a future victory over the socialists, the christian democrats of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) who are in his coalition now may bring his leadership into question.

For the moment, the pact sealed between Fraga and Oscar Alzaga, the leader of the PDP, is that both will control their respective forces with an iron hand to repeat the offer of the coalition in the next general elections.

The president of the great business organization, Carlos Ferrer, who is already being mentioned as a possible candidate for the leadership of the Right if Fraga does not overcome point barrier, expresses his support for the Alliance leader in private. Ferrer points out that as long as he remains at the head of the Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE), he is not thinking of any plan of a political type but he does not deny the possibility of devoting himself full-time to high politics when his business organization term is over.

All are awaiting Fraga's test in the municipal elections to uncover their real cards.

#### Teaching Democracy

In the meantime, Fraga is once again touring Spain foot by foot, province by province. On his shoulders is the task of leading the antidemocratic groups back to democracy.

"Manolo, you know that you and I have had some good moments in the 14 years that we have spent in the Cortes together," an old procurator of the Francoist regime told Fraga emotionally when he met him Saturday, 12 March, at the Barajas airport. "Manol, you already know that I do not believe in this; I am not a democrat," nostalgically insisted the procurator.

"Well, I do believe in democracy," replies Fraga trenchantly and smiling.

"Look Manolo, the people angrily boo the matador, calling him sorts of things and few minutes later, after a couple of good passes, they shout with joy and raise him to the skies with a praiseful ovation from the grandstands...."

Fraga replies, pointing with his index finger at the imaginary bull: "Well, that is precisely what democracy is. To book when something is done that is wrong and applaud when something is done that is right. You could not have presented a better example."

But there is no form in ideas. The procurator continues with his refusal to give the same possibility of a vote to an architect as to a gypsy. Patiently, Fraga defends the egalitarian right of the vote, and in addition, stresses the importance of having the support of the chief of a gypsy camp who "pulls 100 to 200 votes." At the end, despite everything, the procurator will not become convinced, but before returning to Andalucia he will grant that "I am with you, Manolo, because it is you."

Why deny it, Spain still has many thousands of "procurators" who vote because they can vote for Fraga, the man who to them embodies values identified with the old regime.

Perhaps, for that reason also, Fraga sometimes moves on the razor's edge, between criticism and statements of a destabilizing hue, in a strategy of tough opposition on all fronts that has already been denounced by President Gonzalez. "The opposition has the duty and the right to operate like that," Fraga usually comments.

"First," adds the president, "because it is false and the constitutional court will show it. That is the tip of an iceberg that has not yet emerged."

It is the image of a Miguel Herrero directly accusing President Gonzalez with gesture and word during the debate on the decree of expropriation of Rumasa, accusing him of acting outside the law.

Gonzalez, seeking now to halt the besieging and overthrowing operation that has been put into operation from Fraga's ranks and which has not yet gained strength. It must be recalled that Fraga gives himself 2 years to achieve the fall of the Socialist cabinet. In reality, what is at stake now is to learn something that has always been placed in doubt by the Right: Felipe Gonzalez' endurance capacity and the fragility or strength of his jaw. They are feints between Fraga's men and President Gonzalez. Public appearances have been utilized to assess the first 100 days of the performance of the socialist government to exchange blows in the direction indicated.

Owing to the need to get an agreement for the collaboration of the nationalists, Fraga inveighs against "separatism" and "hackneyed independentism" but he opens up to positions of autonomy with greater generosity than in previous stages; perhaps, honoring his phrase that politics is always "the least bad solution."

Adolfo Suarez Prepared to Consolidate Himself in the Leadership of a Radical Swing Party

"The process of transfers has stopped and the government has done very wrong in stopping it," declared Fraga in Bilbao. And during all of his tour through the Basque Country he sang the praises of foralism as he had never been known to do before.

In the confidence of analysis, at the end of the work day, Fraga observes to his collaborators that at his age, 60 years, the only thing he wants is to leave a bipartisan system consolidated in Spain; that he does not have any ambition to be prime minister and whoever thinks so is mistaken. But what is certain is that Fraga acts as if the mistaken ones are right.

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## POSSIBLE RESTRUCTURING OF GENERALITAT AFTER AUTONOMY VOTE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 22 Mar 83 p 19

[Article by Jaime Millas: "Second Government of the Generalitat of Valencia Could Include An Executive Vice President"]

[Text] Valencia--The second government of the Generalitat of Valencia, to be formed following the autonomy vote, could, if the socialists obtain an absolute majority, create an executive vice presidency, a nonexistent office as of now. This plan has been proposed by Deputy Antonio Sotillo, spokesman for the Socialist Parliamentary Group in the dissolved Provisional Assembly, to the secretary general of the PSPV - PSOE [Socialist Party of the Valencian Country - Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and president of the Generalitat, Joan Lerma. Sotillo has offered to head the carrying out of these executive and coordinative functions. On the other hand, an independent could be brought into the new Valencian executive.

The creation of a vice presidency, equivalent to the office held by Alfonso Guerra [deputy prime minister] in the national government, was proposed by Sotillo to Joan Lerma in a letter delivered on 16 March, in which he disclosed his intention not to continue as the socialist spokesman in the new legislative chamber to be formed following the autonomy vote, stating that to fulfill that function without being a member of the executive would be to play the role of a silent guest. The socialist deputy also stated that he "would accept nothing less than the office of 'conseller' of the Presidency with very broad powers," whose function would be to deal with institutional relations, the civil service, the juridical system, the coordination of "consellerias," liaison with the national government, and functions not part of other portfolios.

"In Madrid, this is called the vice-presidency [deputy prime ministership] of the government," Sotillo affirms to EL PAIS. "And it is a good solution to the need for a bumper and, at the same time, a shock-absorbent cushion around the Presidency of the Generalitat. The Basque Government has understood this. Mario Fernandez performs these functions and Garaikoetxea keeps to the sidelines. Pujol refused to do this and thus more easily eroded his image. Someone has to parry the blows, has to be the bad guy. In this new phase of the 'Consell' the coordination of the 'consellerias,' to be done by the 'conseller of the Presidency,' is an absolute necessity."

This initiative conflicts with the limited scope given to these functions in the first Consell of the Generalitat. The creation of the Undersecretariat of the Presidency, headed by Rafael Blasco, and the consideration of the conseller of interior, Felipe Guardiola, as the vice president, provide in part the executive support structure being proposed by the socialist deputy. Sotillo states that he does not aspire to a representational vice presidency, a function that, in his opinion, Guardiola can continue to perform; on the other hand, he recognizes that there may be other candidates for the conselleria he is proposing.

In the present Regional Government, Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, and Transportation, are the two portfolios in other than PSOE hands that will have to be covered by socialists candidates if a one-party executive is formed after a socialist victory at the polls. The PSOE is studying the bringing in of an independent--Luis Font de Mora, an agricultural engineer and current president of the Territorial Union of Agricultural Cooperatives--for the agricultural portfolio.

As a first step, his name has been included in ninth place in the autonomy ballot listing. Font de Mora ran on a unitary candidacy ticket for the Senate in 1977; the ticket was defeated, partly because the PSOE refused to back it. He also held a seat in the Democratic Junta of the Valencian Country as an independent.

As regards the organization of the remaining portfolios, the most recent sessions of the Consell have structured the form and the internal organization of the Consellerias of Culture and Education, Labor, Public Health and Social Security, in furtherance of a policy that seeks to consolidate the merger of these functions, that has been achieved, into a single portfolio, to configure a government of reduced size.

9399  
CSO: 3548/284

## SENSITIVE POLITICAL ISSUES ON RIGHTS OF ARRESTED

## Interministerial, Interparty Tensions

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 22 Mar 83 p 1

[Text] The persistence of difficulties between the Ministries of Justice and Interior over the regulation of rights of the arrested has created a growing tension within the government, which had planned to comply with this constitutional mandate within the first few months of the current legislative term. The resistance being put up by the security forces with respect to the development of one of the most progressive parts of the Constitution, is, on the other hand, placing the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] in a difficult position with respect to the provisions of the draft bill that are being sponsored by the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] to codify the rights of habeas corpus and legal counsel.

In the view of high government officials--not only in the Ministry of Justice--the successive eviscerations of the texts initially proposed by that ministry have come to make it clear that the difficulties do not stem from technical considerations but rather from a conceptual definition of the right of arrest of citizens that clashes head-on with the constitutional precept.

The objective of guaranteeing that torture and mistreatment will not take place during police proceedings seems ever more distant, if a compromise text is accepted that has been worked out with the security agencies, and that would have the backing of the Popular Parliamentary Group, but that would be opposed within the PSOE itself and by the progressive minority groups. Meanwhile, the government is temporarily at a loss for a response to the PNV proposal for codifying the habeas corpus and to the PCE proposal on the right to legal counsel, both of which are pending proceedings in the Parliament.

## Nature of Unresolved Differences

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 22 Mar 83 p 14

## [Article by Bonifacio De La Cuadra]

[Text] Madrid--The opposition of the security agencies to the appropriate legal codification of certain of the

constitutional rights affecting the arresting of persons --the rights of habeas corpus and of legal counsel--has given rise to a conflict between the Ministries of Interior and Justice, which, in turn, is creating a rising tension that is also affecting other members of the Cabinet, according to well-informed sources. The delaying of the two organic bills has left the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], on the other hand, without any alternative with respect to the initiatives of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], which are under study in the Congress.

The constitutional concept that holds the freedom and security of the individual to be prior rights is in a head-on collision with the attempt by the security forces to impose a philosophy that is less constrictive and that, in sum, permits the carrying out of police procedures with less juridical guarantees for the arrested.

This is the reason why the successive texts that have been drawn up by the Ministry of Justice since December of last year have all come to nought. During the last few days, the negotiations between high officials of Justice and Interior have been marked by tensions nearing the breaking point, such as when an attempt was made to incorporate into the bill the proviso that the right to legal counsel could be exercised only after the first 24 hours after having been arrested.

Generally speaking, the Ministry of Justice has pulled back considerably from its initial positions. From a position that the right of legal counsel cannot, under any circumstances whatever, be waived and that the freedom of choice of attorney is in all cases inalienable, Fernando Ledesma's Ministry has backed off to one of admitting waiver in cases relating to moving traffic violations and the automatic appointment of an attorney for persons held incommunicado, in addition to reducing to 4 hours the initial period of 8 hours after which police proceedings may begin without counsel.

As regards habeas corpus, or the right to be brought immediately before a court of law in cases of illegal arrest, the Ministry of Justice has also modified its initial text, not, however, because of objections on the part of the Ministry of Interior--which considered this provision postponable and therefore did not enter into negotiations concerning it--but rather on the basis of views expressed by the General Council of the Judicial. The present text holds those persons to be or to have been under illegal arrest who "though having been legally placed under arrest or interned, are being or have been, while detained, subjected to mistreatment or torture."

Among the most substantial modifications of content, there is one that empowers the judge to only admit evidence presented by the person who has been deprived of his or her freedom, "if it is deemed pertinent." Also, the judge, besides hearing testimony in connection with the prosecution and punishment

of crimes that may have been committed "by persons having ordered the arrest," will also hear testimony "when a possible joinder is perceivable, where there has been false testimony or crime of simulation." The proviso has also been added that, when a request for habeas corpus that has been denied by the investigating magistrate is resubmitted to the Provincial Court, the latter may reject it outright if its illegality "is manifest."

In the Ministry of Interior, there has been a lack of coordination, which has contributed to the delay in resolving the problem. The minister, Jose Barrionuevo, has come out in support of the codification of these rights, and the undersecretary of interior, Carlos Sanjuan, has stated enthusiastically that the Spanish codification of the right to legal counsel would be "the most progressive one in Europe." The spokesman for the department, Julio Fernandez, for his part, told this newspaper yesterday that the talks "must not be going too badly" and that "agreements are being reached" on the points under discussion.

Meanwhile, the technical secretary general of the Ministry, Maria del Carmen Briones, interlocutress for the department, has sided more with the security forces than with the heads of the Ministry. The attitude of Carmen Briones, one of the most controversial appointments within the PSOE (Deputy Pablo Castellano was referring to her, among others, when he spoke of "undesirable" appointments), is considered by left-wing sources in the PSOE to be a continuation of her "repressive" performance with the UCD [Democratic Center Union] government, especially during her tenure as Labor Ministry delegate in Caceres, from which position she rose to that of adviser to the undersecretary of labor, Jose Miguel Prados Terriente.

The positions taken by Interior in the codification of these rights have been disquieting to, among other sectors of the PSOE, the Drafting Committee of Under Secretaries of the Councils of Ministers, and to the leaders of the Socialist Parliamentary Group.

Sources within the latter have indicated to this newspaper that the delay in these bills may pose a delicate situation in Parliament, since one of the forthcoming plenary sessions of the Congress must be dedicated to voting on whether to take into account the proposed bills of the PNV on habeas corpus and of the PCE on the right of the arrested to legal counsel.

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CSO: 3548/284

## CONSERVATIVE PARTY REACHES THIRTY PERCENT IN SIFO POLL

First for Nonsocialist Party

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Mar 83 p 6

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander]

[Text] For the first time a nonsocialist party has reached 30 percent in an opinion poll. In this month's SVENSKA DAGBLADET/SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] survey, the Conservative Party had the backing of 30 percent of the voters surveyed.

That is a percentage point higher than the Conservatives received last month, when the party reached the 1971 record support level achieved by the Center Party.


The other big winner this month is the Center Party, which gained 2 percentage points. The Liberal Party also made a small gain.

The Social Democrats, VPK [Left-Party Communists] and the other parties registered losses.

The Social Democrats had the support of 44.5 percent of the voters, a reduction of 1.5 percent, the Conservatives had 30 percent (a gain of 1 percent), the Center Party had 14 percent (+2 percent), VPK had 5 percent (-0.5 percent), the Liberals had 4.5 percent (+0.5 percent) and other parties had 2 percent (-1.5 percent).

The survey was made between 23 February and 15 March and included 991 interviews. Four percent of those surveyed did not reply or refused to reveal their party sympathies, an increase of 1 percent over the previous month.

To get an idea of the statistical reliability of the changes, one should compare them with the levels parties attained in the long-range trend chart. These figures show that the Conservative gain is significant and the Center gain is on the borderline of being significant.



There is a 14.5 percent difference between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, less than in any previous opinion poll. To find a parliamentary election in which any nonsocialist party received over 30 percent of the votes, it is necessary to go all the way back to 1914.

**Key:**

1. Left-Communist Party	4. Center Party
2. Social Democrats	5. Conservative Party
3. Liberal Party	

### Social Democratic Decline

How are things going for the Social Democrats? To get a picture of developments for the government party one must go back to the fall election and compare a long series of figures.

One then sees that after the election, the Social Democrats noted these figures: 46.5, 45.5, 45.0, 46.0 and now 44.5.

With the exception of the January survey, all the figures have shown a declining trend.

This suggests that the January figure was a random statistical fluctuation and that the government party's trend is a declining one. If three out of four surveys give the same picture, it is no coincidence.

### Quick Setback

On the other hand, it is obvious that there is a constant rising trend in the figures for the Conservative Party: 25.5, 27.0, 28.0, 29.0 and now 30.0. That series of figures is not difficult to interpret either.

However this is not unique. The rise of the Center Party in the early 1970's and that of the Social Democrats in 1977 went just as quickly. In both cases, the gains were followed by a quick setback. If the Conservatives can now manage to consolidate their gains at this high level, then there will be good reason to talk about a unique upturn.

The development in the Center Party since the election has been more irregular. After some months with declining voter support, the party is now back at 14 percent--the level the party reached in the first poll taken after the election.

### Crossing Bloc Lines

Since the nonsocialist parties made gains of 3.5 percent while the socialists declined by 2 percent, there must have been some voter crossover between the two blocs.

However, it can also be conjectured that there is a connection between the middle-spectrum party gains and the losses in support for minor parties.

Environmental parties have disappeared from the debate since the election for several reasons. This could have led the middle parties to regain some of their sympathizers who went over to the Environment Party last year.

### Between Social Democrats and Conservatives

Another interesting question is whether there are more direct crossovers between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats than there used to be.

The SVENSKA DAGBLADET/SIFO survey gives no definite clues on this, since the poll just gives the net figures for the various parties. An analysis of voter shifts between parties would have to be based on a number of different voter barometers.

But if we use some caution, we can state that nothing in the SIFO poll contradicts the idea voiced by the Conservatives that voters in increasing numbers are shifting between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives--and vice versa--without using any other party as an intermediate station.

The latest survey says nothing about the situation of the Liberal Party and VPK, except that there have been no significant changes.

The difference between the blocs--a 1-percent margin for the Social Democrats and VPK--is the smallest since March 1980.

#### Voter Disappointment With SDP Apparent

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Mar 83 p 2

[Article by Gunnar Andren]

[Text] No one, not even the prime minister, should be surprised at the public opinion decline for the government party in the SIFO poll for March.

It was expected and what is more, it was no accident.

The Social Democrats have not lived up to their election promises, for the simple reason that it is impossible to carry out these promises, because they are unrealistic. What we are seeing is undoubtedly nothing but the beginning of the discontent resulting from unfulfilled expectations.

One should note that the small parties are now getting lower figures than they did in the election. In the table below, we can see the same pattern from 1980 and 1981.

The reason is that despite their difficult public opinion situation during election campaigns, parties not represented in parliament have an even harder time in between election campaigns. Now they are "forgotten" entirely.

One should bear this in mind when evaluating the collective strength of the three nonsocialist parliamentary parties. For March they registered as much as 48.5 percent (the long-term trend for February was 45.4 percent), a figure one would have to go back 3 years to match.

At that time, incidentally, the Center Party reached a "top figure" in connection with the popular referendum against nuclear power on 23 March 1980, which had something to do with it.

But it would be wise to conjecture that some of the voters who now seem to have abandoned KDS [Christian Democratic Party], the Environment Party and other parties not represented in parliament might not be willing to really transfer their loyalties in an election to the Conservatives, the Liberals or the Center Party, the three main parties with whom the smaller parties have a "voter exchange."

The above should be weighed against the fact that it is quite obvious that some of those who voted for the Social Democrats in the election are now "shifting back" to the nonsocialist bloc.

The Conservatives are now making further advances and have reached a record support level of 30 percent.

Are we on the way to a two-party system?

The question was asked in connection with the February survey. The answer now, as it was then, is probably not. In addition to the fact that the election system with its strict proportionality for parties that reach the 4-percent level tends to counteract the two-party system, it is very likely that the party system is more stable than we suspect.

What we can see, however, is that for one thing the voters have a hard time understanding the importance of having two middle parties--this has been quite obvious for a number of years now--and for another, they see an increasingly smaller "distance" between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats.

The tendency toward an increase in direct party crossovers between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, clearly demonstrated in the big 1979 election survey by Professor Soren Holmberg (the 1982 version has already been greatly delayed) has apparently not abated, on the contrary, it has continued.

SIFO chief Hans Zetterberg: "There is now a significant increase in direct crossovers without making an 'intermediate landing' in one of the middle parties. In the past this was primarily a Stockholm phenomenon, but now it is occurring all across the country."

"This knowledge will certainly have an effect on partisan behavior."

Is it not possible to view the very sharp exchanges of opinions, at least in the foreign policy sector, between Olof Palme and Ulf Adelsohn/Carl Bildt as a sign of the uneasiness felt by the Social Democrats in light of a development that is new in Sweden, but well-known from many other lands?

Zetterberg: "It could at least be the beginning of an entirely new situation in terms of voter psychology. In the past the Social Democrats were able to act as if the Conservatives did not exist. That is impossible now.

And it may be difficult for Olof Palme to establish a dialogue with the voters that leads directly to Social Democracy. Will he reach them by scolding and complaining?"

There is little to be said about the smallest and still declining parties left in parliament, the Liberal Party and VPK.

Support for these parties is close to their election results. Changes from the previous month are entirely within the so-called statistical margin of error.

The Liberal Party congress and the re-election of Ola Ullsten did not change anything for the Liberal Party--which is probably to the liking of Ullsten's many detractors within the party.

The VPK agreement on an increase in the value-added tax, the tobacco tax and food subsidies has not led to any lasting change of sympathy in that quarter in favor of Lars Werner.

The Center Party's gain, the only statistically reliable change from the previous month, can probably be attributed to a large extent to the fact that the forestry account law gave the Center Party a kind of profile issue in which party voters could again recognize both the environmental and the fighting profiles of the Center Party.

Another thing, which could in the long run benefit Thorbjorn Falldin, is that the problems now dogging the Palme government are so big--and getting bigger--that the Falldin government period, so strongly criticized by many critics both inside and especially outside the Center ranks for indecisiveness in particular, may gradually appear in a brighter light and be remembered as a happier time.

Just remember when the budget deficit was only 75 billion kronor.

But at the moment, Falldin might be content to send a red rose to Agricultural Minister Svante Lundkvist, who has been buffeted by high winds recently for reasons not entirely his own fault. The rose would be in gratitude for his help with the poli results.

But to return to the declining figures for the Social Democrats. Is the reason simply "dissatisfaction" with the poor economy? No, of course not.

But this could be the first of three important partial explanations.

The second would be that the Social Democrats are quickly becoming associated again with the power associated by voters in general with regulations, taxes and [word illegible], which--rightly or wrongly--the public labels bureaucracy.

That was one of the main reasons for the fall of the Social Democrats in 1976. And as the SIFO leader pointed out, for a long time after that the Social Democrats were associated with what used to be called the "arrogance of power."


Now we have all the data coordination, controls, controls and more controls. Can you recognize the pattern?

The third reason could be said to lie in lack of leadership, demonstrated quite emphatically in the "War of the Roses" which has raged recently over the direction of the economy--and which has shown more than anything else how low the level of awareness of the crisis seems to be within the LO [Federation of Trade Unions] leadership.

Before, Strang or Erlander or perhaps even Palme might have stood up and said what the conditions were like. Now the debate is flowing--very lovely, but how dangerous if no guidance can be found at all in the end.

The March decline for the Social Democrats is no accident.

It is undoubtedly just the beginning of something no one knows anything definite about for the time being.



SVENSKA DAGBLADET/SIFO Voter Barometer

Key:

1. Long-range trends	5. Conservatives
2. Latest figures	6. Liberal Party
3. Social Democrats	7. Left-Party Communists
4. Center Party	

The long-range trend levels in February were: Conservatives, 27.9 percent, Liberals, 4.9 percent, Center, 12.6 percent, Social Democrats, 45.8 percent, VPK, 5.2 percent.

The most recent part of the diagram has been enlarged. Figures are taken from the table below and from earlier surveys.

Which Party Do You Think Is Best Today?

<u>Party preference of eligible voters, aged 18-70</u>	<u>Date of Survey</u>					
	<u>Mar 83</u>	<u>Feb 83</u>	<u>Dec 82</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>	<u>Mar 81</u>	<u>Mar 80</u>
Conservative Party	30	29	28	25	22.5	26
Liberal Party	4.5	4	5.5	7.5	8	6.5
Center Party	14	12	13	10.5	12.5	17
Social Democrats	44.5	46	45	49.5	50	42.5
Left-Party Communists	5	5.5	5.5	3.5	5.5	7
Other parties	2	3.5	3	4	1.5	1
Eligible voters with a party preference	100	100	100	100	100	100
Percentage of eligible voters casting a blank ballot or not stating party preference	4	3	4.5	4.5	6.5	4
(Citizens interviewed)	(991)	(1011)	(1437)	(1062)	(2002)	(1009)

Interviews in the latest survey were conducted by means of home visits during the period from 23 February to 15 March 1983.

Responses were given in the form of sealed ballots. In the September 1982 election the Conservatives received 23.6 percent of the votes, the Center Party received 15.5, the Liberals 5.9, the Social Democrats 45.6 and VPK 5.6 percent. But the voter barometer figures should be compared with each other, not with election results--the oldest eligible voters were not interviewed, not everyone who has a party preference actually votes and voting performance varies for different parties. The figures are rounded off to whole and half percentage points.

One should not pay much attention to shifts from a trend level (see note above, beneath the diagram) that are less than 2 percent for the Social Democrats and the Conservatives or less than 1.5 percent for other parties. One should also bear in mind that individual changes in a series do not necessarily represent a new trend.

Paper Comments on Poll

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Mar 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Anticipated and Well-Deserved"]

[Text] It is tempting with regard to the latest SIFO poll of voter opinion, as shown in the diagram and table above, to burst out: "Serves them right." The declining trend for the Social Democrats which was only hinted at earlier now seems to be in full swing.

If so, it is well-deserved. The cynical behavior of the Social Democrats during practically the entire opposition period, culminating in the big bluff during the election campaign, was basically revealed after the fall election victory.

The betrayal of pension recipients--with the blessing of the highest representatives of the Social Democratic-dominated pension recipients' organization, PRO [expansion unknown]--occurred almost immediately after the election. It was a decision--concrete and clearcut. But in general, what could be described as the big Social Democratic betrayal has been manifested more by a constant development than by concrete decisions.

It has gradually become increasingly clear that the Social Democrats will not be able to live up to their election promises and that specifically they cannot live up to the expectations they created among large groups of voters.

They sharply criticized the fact that real wages declined during the period of nonsocialist rule. They said there had to be an end to that. This aroused an expectation of higher real wages and an improved standard of living for Swedish citizens. Now even prominent Social Democrats and LO men admit that real wages will decline even further in the next few years.

The Social Democrats used unemployment as a starting point in a campaign that said it was caused by nonsocialist incompetence and lack of involvement. Now a discussion is going on within the Social Democratic Party as to whether or not to try to fight unemployment with methods that in themselves would produce more unemployment.

It should in time be obvious to large groups of voters that before the election the Social Democrats said things they cannot support now and which /even then they knew they would be unable to back up./ [in italics] This kind of thing is called a bluff and usually has an adverse effect on the originator when it is revealed. Thus a voter reaction is only natural.

A reaction would also be reasonable on the basis of the tangible change in the social climate that took place after the socialist power takeover, the

new spirit in politics whose most serious manifestation so far has been the new general clause.

But we should be careful about deciding that today's SIFO poll is confirmation that the reaction has already started. After all, the deviation from the previous poll is not that great. And there is always reason to bear in mind that opinion polls are one thing and elections another and that it will be quite a long time before we have another election.

But it is possible to note with certainty in this situation that the Social Democrats have received their just deserts in not seeing more than a trace of the upturn that usually follows an election victory.

The nonsocialist bloc is now not only a little bit larger than the Social Democrats--it is also very close to the total socialist bloc strength.

The Conservative Party has consolidated its position as the leading non-socialist force. The party now has the support of 30 percent of the electorate, which is a record not only for the Conservative Party, but for any nonsocialist party in Sweden. The violent attacks the Social Democrats launched against the Conservatives, punctuated with vulgar personal attacks on Ulf Adelsohn and unfounded accusations, especially in the area of foreign policy, have missed their mark.

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CSO: 3650/157

## ILICAK ON REALISTIC PARAMETERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES LAW

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 22 Mar 83 pp 1,14

[Editorial by Nazli Ilicak: "Do Not Ever Take Advice From Such Advisors"]

[Text] The papers have been talking about certain new bans that may be included in the Political Parties Law in the form of provisional articles. It is said that the provincial and even the district leaders of the banned political parties will be deprived of the right to participate in politics for a certain period of time. We are of the opinion that these rumors will not come true. We have a brand new constitution in our hands. Article 69 of that constitution says: "The founders and the leaders at every level of permanently banned political parties cannot be the founders, administrators and managers of a new political party." It is an indisputable fact that this provision cannot be made to act retroactively and that it can only be applied to parties which may be closed down in the coming years. Constitutional Commission Chairman Orhan Aldikacti has some very explicit statements to this effect. Most importantly, General Evren said in a speech promoting the Constitution in Antalya:

"They are saying that the administrators and organizing members of banned parties in provinces and districts are also banned from forming new parties and being administrators of new parties. No, this provision of the Constitution concerning political parties cannot be interpreted in that manner. If the Constitutional Court closes down any parties in the future, then administrators at every level of that party will not be able to form new parties. This provision will not apply to the administrators of the parties closed down after 12 September 1980."

It is unthinkable that the province and district leaders of former parties will lose their right of forming a new party or winning the support of a majority of that party in spite of this assurance. But we hear that such suggestions are being made by some advisors. We hear that it is being said: "Since this is an emergency period and since we have Law No 2324 of 27 October 1980, Article 69 of the 1982 Constitution can be suspended on the basis of Article 6 of this law." The said "Law on Constitutional Order" says that laws issued or to be issued by communiques or decrees by the approval of the National Security Council cannot be claimed to be unconstitutional. Article 6 of the said law says that "those provisions included or to be included in the communiques or decrees of the National Security Council and those laws issued by the approval of the Council which do not conform with the provisions of the 1961 Constitution must be put into effect as constitutional amendments."

It is an indisputable fact that this law concerns only the 1961 Constitution and that the 1982 Constitution is binding even on the National Security Council. It is surprising that despite this obvious fact there are advisors who can say that "there is a Law on Constitutional Order, dated 27 October 1980, providing for imposing new bans."

There was a businessman who was looking for an advisor. He advertised in the papers, and there were many applicants. The businessman decided to interview each of the applicants individually in order to select one of them as his advisor. He told the first applicant who entered the room: "You do not look like a good advisor."

The applicant objected: "That is not true, sir. I am an excellent advisor."

The businessman told the second applicant: "I do not like you. You do not look like a possible success."

The applicant replied: "Sir, I served in many positions, and I was very successful in all of them."

All the applicants entered the room in their turn, the businessman said similar things to all of them and got similar answers. Finally, the last applicant entered. The businessman told him: "You do not look like an advisor to me."

The applicant bowed to the floor and said: "You are right sir."

"Then you are not an advisor."

"If you say so, sir."

"But you can be an advisor if you want to."

"Yes sir. I can do it very well."

"But you agree with everything I say. That is not right."

"Of course it is not right."

The applicant was hired.

Those who confuse advising with being yes men mostly hurt those they are serving. They are never hurt themselves, because they are always in the shadows. The one who finds himself in a difficult position before the public is the individual who makes the decision.

May God save us all from advisors who deceive, confuse and show the wrong path.

9588

CSO: 3554/218

## PARTIES LAW SEEN AS PLOY TO MAINTAIN JUNTA IN POWER

London ISCININ SESI in Turkish 14 Feb 83 p 1

[Article by Aliye P. Atilgan: "The Junta's Political Parties Ploy"]

[Text] The Constitutional Commission has completed the draft law on political parties. Knowing that the Constitution was also drafted by this commission, we can easily say that this draft bill will also become law without significant changes in its essence.

The most significant conclusion that emerges from the draft bill on political parties, which was prepared according to the dispositions of the Evren junta, is that the fascist junta does not even trust the bourgeois parties. The junta is so deeply afraid of democracy that it is daunted not only by itself, but also by its shadow.

The bill, in its entirety, is aimed at preventing the formation of powerful and centralized parties irrespective of their political inclinations. For example, the decisions of assembly groups will no longer be binding on deputies. The deputies will be able to abstain in votes over group decisions. According to Article 16 of the bill, opposition within parties will have to be represented in central executive organs and will be able to express its views in party publications.

[Constitutional Commission Chairman Orhan] Aldikacti's words in defense of the bill are very interesting: "We wanted to prevent certain factions from taking control of parties; we wanted to prevent oligarchy."

The fact that the Constitutional Commission--which has provided invaluable services to the fascist junta toward institutionalizing fascism--has suddenly become a "proponent of intraparty democracy" shows very well the things that the "calendar of transition to democracy" wants to impose on our people. The fascist junta is contemplating a political parties and election law such that no party that it does not support can grow to be strong and such that society does not harbor any organized and "dangerous" centers of power other than itself. Behind the slogan of "ending oligarchic dictatorships" lies the ambition to set up the dictatorship of "another oligarchy," namely the fascist junta.

Low-key debates about an election date have been under way in the last few days, although those debates have not been out in the open. There have been repeated and frequent demands for permission for the formation of political parties before the electoral law goes into effect, or at least for the start of preliminary work.

It is obvious that the "politicos" of the junta are in a tight spot concerning the date of the elections. An election in the autumn of 1983 will find the parties unprepared. The junta, "the best organized and richest party" of the society, will collect the purse. The postponement of the elections to 1984, together with strong and "democratic" evidence to the effect that they were not the ones who postponed the elections, will also help the junta.

Meanwhile, the debates on the new parties that are going to be formed show that the bourgeoisie has reached agreement on two large parties: one of them a "liberal" party and the other one a "social democratic" party. Many writers who call themselves "democrats" do not see anything "undemocratic" about rumors that 5 to 10 percent thresholds will be imposed on small parties in the new election system. Liberal bourgeois writer Hikmet Bil must have been very happy about the green light given by the junta to the formation of a social democratic party to praise the "two-party system" to the sky. Saying that Ataturk was the originator of this idea, Bil writes:

"Our experience of the past years has shown to all of us that in Turkey small parties 'hurt' the administration of the country more than they 'help'." (HURRIYET, 6 February 1983)

Thus, it is becoming increasingly clear that the electoral law will not run into much opposition from the liberal bourgeoisie.

Social democratic writer Teoman Erel, who voted against the Constitution, states in his article entitled "Socialist Party" that "the formation of socialist parties must be permitted." But when one reads Erel's article in its entirety one sees that the writer is not so concerned about "democracy" and that he is dreaming about "better ways of preserving capitalism." Erel says:

"Another drawback of banning socialist parties is that the social pressure resulting from the economic stability programs, which have been implemented for years and which have been based on the sacrifices of low-income groups, will provide material for the formation of underground parties.

"...Bans that are hard to implement and that have unknown results, far from achieving 'stability', can lead to unhealthy 'high pressures' which may start building up here and there and which will eventually make themselves felt." (MILLIYET, 5 May 1983)

It is our duty to uncover before the eyes of the public the junta's efforts to institutionalize fascism behind the facade of "returning to democracy" and the social democrats' understanding of "democracy" which serves no purpose other than taming the class struggle that will emerge.

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CSO: 3554/218

MILITARY

TURKEY

ECONOMIC, PROCEDURAL SNAGS IN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION WITH U.S.

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 Mar 83 pp 9,10

[Report by Sedat Ergin]

[Text] Ankara--Turkey is delaying its decision concerning the aircraft industry it will set up. It is reported that the last-minute postponement of a planned visit by a U.S. Defense Department delegation to discuss the approximate costs of various types of aircraft will cause further delays in the decision to be made on the type of aircraft [that will be built in Turkey].

Talks in connection with joint aircraft production by Turkey and the United States have repeatedly changed course as a result of economic factors as well as the proposals made by the United States.

These changes in course have so far appeared in two forms. The first of these concerns the number of aircraft to be built. Initially, Turkey decided on a package of 295 aircraft and filed an official request on this number with the U.S. government around the beginning of last year. But Turkey received no response from the U.S. government for its letter of request. Later, Turkey received an indirect message to the effect that the 295-aircraft package be dropped and that a smaller package be chosen.

The U.S. government based this view on two reasons:

1. The 295-aircraft package would cost \$8 to \$10 billion. In view of Turkey's fiscal difficulties, it would be unable to finance a package of this size.
2. The United States itself would find it difficult to commit itself to such a large package. Furthermore, there were a number of countries wishing to start joint aircraft production with the United States, including South Korea, Greece, Israel, Italy, Spain and Egypt.

According to U.S. law, the government is not obliged to respond to the letters of request it receives. The government can make its stance felt by not responding. Thus, the situation was reevaluated in Ankara in the light of the message coming from Washington, and it was decided to reduce the number of aircraft in the package from 295 to 160.

## Second Letter Sent

Turkey sent a second letter of request to the U.S. government last September. In this letter, the number of aircraft whose joint production was requested was reduced to 160. The letter further explained in detail the nature of the joint production being planned.

In the 6 months that have elapsed since then the U.S. government has not responded to that letter either. The statement of cost, which would have been considered a form of response, did not materialize following the postponement of the planned visit by the U.S. Defense Department delegation.

In the United States, it is not the private firms that directly arrange aircraft sales. The government not only has to approve aircraft sales, but also, by placing the orders for the aircraft itself, it is involved in the aircraft manufacturing process from the beginning to the end. Furthermore, as buyers of aircraft the air force and the navy are able to quote aircraft prices which go beyond the bare bones prices of the aircraft and which include maintenance and equipment costs.

At this stage, the U.S. Department of Defense is expected to quote the cost of the aircraft that are being planned to be built over a period of 10 years. Upon that Turkey will continue its contacts with individual aircraft firms and will make a final decision on the type of aircraft it will build.

## Changes in Aircraft Types

The other factor that was dominant in the change of direction of work on joint aircraft production was related to changes in options of aircraft types. When Turkey began work on setting up an aircraft industry, four types of aircraft were under consideration: the British-made Jaguar, the French-made Mirage and the U.S.-made F-16 and F-18. The Jaguar was found technically inadequate and was therefore dropped as an option. France was eliminated for political reasons. Thus, only two options were left: the F-18 built jointly by Northrop and McDonnell-Douglas and the F-16 built by General Dynamics.

While talks were still under way on the first 295-aircraft package, the issue was choosing between these two aircraft. Later, another indirect message was received from Washington. The message said that a country like Turkey whose industry is just beginning to develop and which does not have the level of technology necessary for an aircraft industry could have difficulty in building F-16s or F-18s starting from scratch. Could Turkey not start with F-20s? At this point, the F-20, built by Northrop, became a third option.

Firstly, the F-20 cost less. The cost could be reduced further by crossing the F-20 with the F-18. The F-20, which is the advanced version of the F-5, was powered by the single engine of the F-18 and was rigged with electronic equipment similar to the F-18. However, these aircraft had not yet entered service. Test flights were still under way. The United States had developed the F-20 both to upgrade the F-5 and to sell it to friendly countries with limited financial resources.

However, when Turkey embarked on the aircraft industry project, the F-20 was not being considered. Thus, the preparations had to be changed once again.

## SKYLARK ROCKET TO SEND UP EQUIPMENT FOR METALLURGY TESTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Apr 83 p 36

[Article by Roland Gyllander: "Skylark Rocket Into the Northern Sky--Smelters up in Space"]

[Text] A Skylark rocket will be sent up into the northern sky from the Esrange rocket base outside of Kiruna. Within a short time its forward part with the rocket payload onboard will soar in a parabola, approximately like a thrown stone, but at an altitude of 300 km. Then it will be in a weightless state, and then a dozen automatic smelters onboard will begin to function. Metal will be melted and will solidify under conditions which would never be attainable here on earth.

When the part of the rocket with the smelters falls back to earth beneath a parachute it will contain metals in strange forms and mixtures--an entirely new research area for the metallurgists.

In the weightlessness of space, a "foam metal" can be produced--analogous to foam rubber or foam plastic--metals can be mixed which on the ground would immediately separate approximately like oil and water. The diffusion phenomena and construction of crystals, etc. can be studied in a weightless condition.

## Can Be Profitable

Most of this is pure basic research. Will it have any practical importance? Will production smelters ever be sent out in orbits around the world?

"It can be profitable," said Hasse Fredriksson, professor of metal casting at the Institute of Technology in Stockholm.

"If a 50 percent increase in the life of a jet turbine for an airliner can be attained by manufacturing it in space, the increased cost would be justified," he said.

In this calculation the cost of the launching, casting in space, and return to earth again must be compared with the profit from keeping an airliner in operation 50 percent longer before the engine needs overhaul.

Castings which solidify in a weightless condition have a different crystalline structure (see diagram) and thereby have different properties, for example increased strength.

One of the areas which Hasse Fredriksson is studying is the formation of pores in metals. On earth, test pieces of aluminum alloy are being prepared which will be melted and solidified under pressure in a hydrogen atmosphere. In this way some hydrogen is released into the metal. If the metal is again heated under normal atmospheric pressure, the hydrogen is released and bubbles up through the metal. The gas bubbles of course have much lower weight than the metal.

#### Weigh 'Nothing'

But in the weightlessness of space the concept of weight does not exist. The bubbles and the metal "weigh" the same, nothing. If the metal containing hydrogen is melted in space, the bubbles therefore remain where they were introduced in the melted metal, and this foams up like a dough.

When it has all solidified there is a piece of porous metal with rare properties. Perhaps a future light and highly resistant dampening material?

Furthermore, in a weightless condition a metallic structure of unusual purity and regularity can be created.

So-called semiconductor material for transistors and computer chips consists of crystals which are dipped, "contaminated" intentionally with foreign matter. If the crystals can grow forth from the melt in weightlessness, the distribution of the dipping material becomes unusually even.

Many alloys and metals, for example titanium, are easily contaminated by material from their own crucibles. But in space a crucible is not even needed. The entire melted mass can create a free-floating clump, held together by its own surface tension and controlled by magnetic fields or something similar.

#### 'Group Trips'

Since 1977 Rymdbolaget has constructed and launched smelting experiments for research. That has mainly taken place with rockets from Esrange, in cooperation with the German NEXUS program--rocket and space launchings are often "group trips" for the research projects of several countries.

Smelter experiments have also been flown with NASA's modified Starfighter aircraft--it is actually possible to simulate weightlessness in a normal aircraft as they fly a parabola, about like a thrown stone--but after a minute the aircraft hydraulic system begins to protest.

Next year a large crystal-growing experiment will perhaps be flown in a so-called GAS container which will accompany some of the United States space flights.

The smelting ovens which are now being sent up with rockets are necessarily rather small, especially if 12 or more are to be assembled on a surface barely one-half meter in diameter. The pieces of metal being melted are about the size of a fingertip.

The ovens are electric and of different types. They are powered by a large number of connected lithium or silver-zinc batteries which are able to deliver the high power required to quickly heat up the smelting samples to perhaps 1,000 degrees. The weightless condition lasts for 6-7 minutes, and during that time the samples will be able to both melt and solidify, perhaps slowly.

The ovens are fabricated at Rymdbolaget. A common type is called a reflecting oven, and utilizes halogen lamps which are purchased from a known lamp company. They are delivered equipped with small reflectors, and look like the inserts in a normal headlight. In the ovens they are mounted in pairs facing each other, about like a pair of cupped hands. In the middle between them, where the rays concentrate and the heat is greatest, the little pipe-shaped crucible is placed which contains the metal sample.

#### Pioneer Work

In another type of oven the lamps are taken apart and the naked filaments are covered with a little insulated "overcoat" of the substance bornitride and put into the metal sample to be melted. This method also works well.

Much of the work is of a purely pioneer character. Weightlessness is an unexplored area, and is constantly bringing in new surprises for scientists and technicians.

Rolf Jonsson at Rymdbolaget can tell about rare tricks which weightlessness creates:

A riddle with the first reflecting ovens was that the halogen lamps were burned through when out in space, and not on the ground, in spite of the power being exactly the same. The explanation was in the phenomenon which scientists try to avoid by melting their samples out in space--heat convection.


#### Smothered Flame

If a melted metal on earth has different temperatures in different places the warmer metal tends to rise. The same applies to liquids and gases. A flame can burn on the ground because the hot gases of the flame rise and make room for fresh air with oxygen which sustains the combustion.

In space the weightless gases of combustion stay in place around the flame and smother it. There are no Christmas candles on a space flight...

In a halogen lamp the filament is surrounded by a protective halogen gas. On earth the gas also functions--who knew?--as a refrigerating agent for the filament. The heated gas streams upward from the filament, is chilled against the cooler glass globe, and returns to the filament, etc.

But in space the halogen gas remained stubbornly around the filament, which became overheated and burned through. The remedy was to reduce the current through the lamp.



Melted metal in a dish on earth (upper left picture) is always "moved around" by heat convection: the warmer metal in the middle rises while the cold near the walls, where the solidification begins, sinks downward. On the other hand if the solidification happens in a weightless state, the melted metal remains still and long crystals with high tensile strength can grow outward. The lower pictures show what happens in a metal containing gas when it melts on earth, and in space.

Key:

1. On earth
2. In space
3. Large number of short crystals
4. Large number of long crystals
5. Gas bubbles away
6. Metal gets "foamy"

## HOME RULE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS LAWS TO CHECK GROWING VIOLENCE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Mar 83 p 24

[Article: "Greenland's Laws Are Mild; Rape Can Be Atoned for With a Fine"]

[Text] Nuuk, Greenland (AP)—What is the most extended police precinct, where there are astronomic murder statistics but no prisons whatsoever and where sentencing is so peculiar that a rapist gets off with a fine? Greenland, of course, that over-2-million-square-kilometer ice-covered rock on which 50,000 people live.

Working on Greenland for 11 years as chief of police has left its mark on John Richard Karlsson, who is now leaving to return to Denmark.

"I will certainly never in my life again regard crime and punishment in the same way I did before I came here," Karlsson said during an interview he gave in honor of his departure.

Although the number of crimes is on the rise in Greenland, Karlsson nonetheless defended the justice system in use, which has its origins in the times of the old Eskimo communities.

"When I came here, I had clearcut ideas about what 'price' had to be paid for what crime. But here you are forced to adopt a more flexible way of thinking."

## Case by Case

Greenland's justice system is based on criminal law and jury courts established in 1954 when the 200-year-old colonial administration came to an end and Greenland became a part of Denmark.

The law does not prescribe penalties for specific crimes, rather the function of the courts is to consider the personality of the lawbreaker and choose a "procedure" that is most likely to keep the criminal on the straight and narrow in future.

In 9 cases out of 10 the criminal gets off with a fine, when a first-offense rape is involved too. A person is not sentenced to a heavier penalty until

he has been found guilty of several rapes, murders, assaults, robberies or burglaries.

When a prison sentence is imposed, it generally means no more than from 1 to 5 years in an open prison, whose inmates, murderers included, leave it to go to work during the day and return only at night to sleep behind bars. Four or five a year of those who have received prison sentences are flown to Denmark to real prisons to serve longer, at most 10-year, terms.

Denmark's lawmakers have preserved the system as before out of respect for the Greenlanders' traditional tolerance extended to lawbreakers and their unwillingness to cut criminals off from the society.

#### Rapists Are Tolerated

An exceptionally mild attitude toward rapists has its origins in the old Eskimo communities, in which women were not quite protected from sexual abuse. Greenlanders still react to sexual crimes in an almost free and easy manner unless the victim suffers bodily injuries.

During the 11 years Karlsson spent there the number of crimes has tripled. He does not, however, blame the crime laws or courts. After all, he has seen for himself how Greenland's old hunting culture has died out, urbanization increased and the housing shortage and unemployment grown.

In other words, the number of disappointments has grown to be so large that many Greenlanders try to drown them in alcohol. Alcoholism is the abyss of the island.

This has, of course, not made things any easier for the work of the 100-man police force. The police, 70 percent of whom (that is, 70 men) are at the present time native Greenlanders, are on the move 3,500 days in the year. They travel by plane, helicopter, boat and dogsled.

The police annually handle 6,600 criminal cases and about as many civil cases, like tax collecting and distraint. The police also serve as customs officials.

According to Karlsson, such "modern-day" crimes as forging checks and tax evasion have increased the press of work for the police these past few years. These were not introduced on his island at all because banks were rare and income tax was completely lacking.

#### Violence Increasing

The most worrisome situation is, however, the increase in crimes of violence. Every third case of death is produced by other than natural causes — that is, accident, suicide, murder, in that order of frequency.

Greenland's murder statistics are probably the world's highest. Every year there are from 10 to 15 murders and from 20 to 25 murder attempts.

As Karlsson sees it, on the plus side there is the fact that organized crime is completely lacking. There are no gangs, no terrorism, drug rings or stolen goods marketing chains.

"It's easier to deal with the most tragic of murders when you know that they are sporadic, special cases," he said.

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END